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ABSTRACT 
 
Modeling Structural Changes in Market Demand and Supply. (August 2010) 
Beom Su Park, B.A, Sung Kyun Kwan University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James W. Richardson 
 
 
 Economic events may cause structural changes in markets. To know the effect of 
the economic event we should analyze the structural changes in the market demand and 
supply. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the effect of selected economic 
events on market demand and supply using econometric models. Structural changes can 
be modeled according to the types of changes. For an abrupt and instantaneous break, a 
dummy variable model can be used. For a smooth and gradual movement, proxy 
variables which represent the event can be applied, if we know the variables. If we don‟t 
know the appropriate proxy variables, a smooth transition regression model can be 
employed. 
 The BSE (Bovine Spongiform Enchphalopathy) outbreak in the U.S. in 2003 is 
assumed to make abrupt and instantaneous changes in Korean meat consumption. To 
analyze the effect on Korean meat consumption, the Korean demands of beef, pork, 
chicken, and U.S. beef are estimated using an LA/AIDS (Linear Approximate Almost 
Ideal Demand System) model with the dummy variable specifying the time before and 
after the BSE. From the results we can confirm that food safety concerns caused by the 
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BSE case changed Korean meat consumption structure. Korean beef and U.S. beef 
became less elastic, and pork and chicken got more elastic to budget. Korean beef 
became less price elastic, but pork and U.S. beef got more price elastic. 
 The changes of U.S. natural gas supply caused by technology development and 
depletion in reserves are analyzed using a smooth transition regression model. From the 
results, we can confirm that the productivity improvement by technology development is 
greater than the labor cost increase by depletion, but not greater than the capital cost 
increase by depletion in mid-2000s.  
 The effects of posting the winning bid in a repeated Vickrey auction are 
examined using a proxy variable. By applying an unobserved effect Tobit model to the 
experimental auction done by Corrigan and Rousu (2006) for a candy bar, we can 
confirm that the changes of bidding behavior are significant, especially when the 
winning bid is high. By extracting the bid affiliation effects, we showed that true 
willingness to pay can be estimated. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Modeling and analyzing structural changes in market demand and supply is one 
of the most popular subjects in empirical economic studies (Holt et al, 2009). What 
market participants such as policy makers, consumers, and producers want to know is 
the response of a market to particular events in the market. The reason is that without 
considering the response they may make a wrong decision, and it can lead to a big loss. 
So analysis of structural changes in market demand and supply is the pursuit of many 
economists.  
The structures of demand and supply can be characterized by parameters in 
demand and supply functions such as elasticities. Structural changes in this study will 
mean changes in parameters. This is in agreement with the literature, as most structural 
change studies looked at parameter changes implicitly (Moschini and Mielke, 1989, 
Phillips, 2001, Cai, 2007, Holt et al, 2009). The changes in elasticities or parameters are 
very informative to market participants, such as, consumers, producers, and policy 
makers. If they understand the changes, they can adjust more quickly, and may change 
their expectations.  
 Structural changes are recognized in the time dimension, because parameter 
changes are identified by the comparison between before and after changes. In terms of  
____________ 
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the time taken for changes to take place, structural changes can be categorized into two 
types: abrupt and instantaneous shifts, and smooth and gradual movements. This 
classification is meaningful because a different modeling technique should be applied for 
each type. First, for an abrupt and instantaneous shift by an economic event, a dummy 
variable model can be used to capture the effects. Second, for a smooth and gradual 
movement by an economic event, proxy variables to cause the movement can be used to 
estimate the effects of the movement if we know the relevant proxy variables and if we 
can quantify the proxy variables. If the proxy variables are not known, a smooth 
transition regression model can be an alternative to estimate the changing paths of 
coefficients. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the effect of selected economic 
events on market demand or supply using econometric models by identifying structural 
changes and the effects of the changes can be estimated and analyzed by identifying the 
structural changes. As an example of an abrupt and instantaneous break, the effects of 
BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) outbreak in the U.S. in Dec. 2003 on Korean 
meat consumption will be analyzed in Chapter II using a dummy variable model. Model 
specification testing methods will also be examined in Chapter II.  
In Chapter III, the effects of technological changes and depletion in the U.S. 
natural gas supply will be investigated. A smooth transition regression model will be 
applied to capture the smooth and gradual movement of U.S. natural gas supply by 
technological development. The effects of smooth and gradual changes in U.S. natural 
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gas reserves will be analyzed using a proxy variable to represent the level of depletion in 
reserves.  
The effects on bidding behavior in a repeated second-price sealed bid 
experimental auction by the event of posting the winning bid will be analyzed in Chapter 
IV. Using proxy variables the changes of bid price and the true willingness to pay (a 
kind of demand) will be estimated. To estimate consistent and efficient coefficients an 
unobserved effects Tobit model will be employed. 
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CHAPTER II 
MODELING AND ANALYZING STRUCTURAL CHANGES OF KOREAN 
MEAT DEMANDS BY BSE IN THE U.S. 2003 
 
Introduction 
 
Recently, the Korean meat market experienced the shock of an overseas animal 
disease outbreak: BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) in the U.S. (December 
2003). The Korean government banned beef imports from the U.S. just after the BSE 
case in the U.S. was reported by USDA, and reopened to U.S beef very restrictively after 
confirming every measure had been taken for removing the risk of BSE.  
The U.S. was the largest supplier of imported beef in the Korean meat market 
(Figure 1). The market share of U.S. beef among beef, pork, and chicken was increasing 
from 1998 to 2003, and the market share in 2003 was over 10% (Figure 2). However, it 
fell to zero after 2003
1
 during the embargo. The consumption of Korean beef was 
decreasing during 1998-2003, but it has increased to 10% of market share after 2003. 
The quantity of pork consumed increased continuously during 1998-2007. The market 
share of pork maintained a steady share of 52-54% during 1996-2003 except 2000 and 
2002 when FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease) broke out (MIFAFF, 2003), but it rose to  
                                                 
1
 The consumption data of Korean beef, pork, chicken, and all imported beef were 
obtained from NACF (National Agricultural Cooperatives‟ Federation). U.S. beef 
consumption was calculated as: 
)(
)(..
)(
tonimportsbeefAll
tonimportsbeefSU
nconsumptiobeefimportedall  . 
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57% in 2004. Chicken consumption and market share increased overall with the highest 
share of 25.7% in 2006 except when AI (Avian Influenza) occurred in 2003-2004 
(MIFAFF, 2008).  
From the market share changes during 1996-2007, we can hypothesize that there 
were changes in the Korean meat demand structure caused by the 2003 BSE outbreak in 
the United States. The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the structural 
change of Korean meat demands caused by the U.S. BSE outbreak in 2003. To analyze 
the effects of BSE, we will estimate the two models of Korean meat demand. Model A is 
the system of Korean beef, pork, chicken, and U.S. beef. Because U.S. beef was not 
imported during Jan. 2004-Mar. 2007, the meat demand structure before 2004 will be 
compared with that after Mar. 2007. Model B is the system of Korean beef, pork, and 
chicken. The demand structure of three periods (before 2004, Jan. 2004-Mar. 2007, and 
after Mar. 2007) will be compared in Model B. From these models we calculate the 
demand parameters such as income elasticities, own price elasticities, and cross price 
elasticities. Changing demand elasticities may be an indication of the structural change 
in the Korean meat market.  
 
Literature Review 
 
A number of reports about BSE and other animal disease shocks on the demands 
for meat have been published. Burton and Young (1996) studied the impact of BSE in 
the U.K. Verbeke and Ward (2001) examined the change of consumer‟s response in 
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meat markets caused by a BSE outbreak in Belgium. Piggot and Marsh (2004) 
investigated impacts on meat demand when U.S. consumers were informed about food 
safety problems.  Peterson and Chen (2005) examined the impact of the BSE outbreak in 
Japan. Most of those reports showed a negative effect on beef consumption.  
There are numerous empirical studies about structural changes in demands. 
Moschini and Meilke (1989) suggested modeling the pattern of structural change in the 
U.S. meat market with an AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) model using dummy 
variables. Chalfant and Alston (1988) and Cortez and Senauer (1996) focused on testing 
the taste and preference changes in the demand for food.  
For the Korean meat market case, Lee et al (1999) and Shin et al (2004) 
estimated the meat demand parameters using the data prior to the U.S. BSE shock. 
However, the effect of the U.S. BSE case on the Korean meat demand in terms of 
structural change has not yet been examined. Song and Chae (2007) estimated the 
Korean social welfare change caused by the U.S. BSE shock, but they used the demand 
parameters from Shin et al (2004). So they assumed the U.S. beef import ban caused no 
structural changes. Henneberry and Hwang (2007) investigated the Korean meat demand 
using a source-differentiated AIDS model, but they used the quarterly wholesale level 
data between 1996 and 2003. So they did not include the effect of the U.S. BSE outbreak 
in their model.  
Park, Jin, and Bessler (2008) tested the structural break in Korean meat market 
caused by the impacts of animal diseases. They showed FMD in 2000, and AI in 2003, 
and the U.S. BSE in 2003 induced structural changes in the Korean meat price series, 
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and the effects of the animal diseases on prices lasted over 1 year using an error 
correction model and historical decomposition method with directed acyclic graphs. Lee 
and Kennedy (2009) studied how the differences in prices and qualities of beef from 
other sources affected the Korean beef market.  
 
Theoretical Framework (LA/AIDS model) 
 
To estimate the complete meat demand system we can apply LES, Rotterdam, 
LA/AIDS, translog or other hybrids of Rotterdam and AIDS models with restrictions, 
such as homogeneity, adding-up, and symmetry. While the LES model assumes 
separable goods, it rules out complementary goods. The Rotterdam model does not 
satisfy integrability conditions necessary to derive the fundamental demand equations 
(Brown and Deaton, 1972). In other words, it does not assume consumer‟s demand 
theory like utility maximization or expenditure minimization. Barten (1993) emphasized 
two conditions of specifying the desirable consumer demand functional form – 
satisfaction of theoretical properties of consumer demand and empirical performance. 
Based on two criteria, Barten suggested a hybrid of the AIDS and Rotterdam model.  
The AIDS model developed by Deaton and Muelbauer (1980), Working (1943), 
and Leser (1963) is a more flexible model relative to Rotterdam and the translog model, 
and it satisfies the properties of demand theory, and demand restrictions such as 
homogeneity and symmetry can be easily tested. Also, the AIDS model is relatively easy 
and simple to do empirical estimation (Buse, 1994), and at the same time its empirical 
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performance is little different from a hybrid demand model (Barten, 1993). In this study 
we will apply a liner approximate AIDS (LA/AIDS) model. 
 The linear approximate AIDS (LA/AIDS) model is usually specified with:  
(1)   
ittti
j
jtijiit uPyLnpLnw   )/()( *  
(2)   
i
itit pLnwPLn )()(
*  
where (i, j) = 1, …, n index the goods, t = 1, …, T indexes time, p denotes nominal price, 
w = pq/y means expenditure share with q being the quantity consumed, and y being the 
total expenditure on n goods. P
*
 denotes the price index approximated by Stone‟s 
geometric index. In addition, we can apply the triad demand restrictions if needed: 
(3)   Adding-up       
i i i
iiji 0β;0;1α   
(4)   Homogeneity   
j
ij 0  
(5)   Symmetry     jiij  . 
 Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) suggested the first differenced form of an AIDS 
model. Because dynamic adjustment properties of meat demand is important, Eales and 
Unnevehr (1988), and Henneberry and Hwang (2007) also used the first differenced 
form.  The first differenced form of equation (1) is 
(6)   ittti
j
jtijit uPyLnpLnw   )/()( * . 
In this study, we will try both level equation form (1) and first differenced form (6), and 
check which form is better.  
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 We can calculate elasticities using the coefficient estimates of equation (1) or (6). 
Assuming dln(P
*
)/dln(pj)=wj, elasticities are (Green and Alston, 1990): 
(7)  Expenditure elasticity      iii w  1  
(8)  Uncompensated own-price elasticity   iiiiii w   1  
(9)  Uncompensated cross-price elasticity  )()( jiwww ijiiijij   . 
 
Incorporating Structural Changes in the System of Equations 
 
Moschini and Meilke (1989) analyzed the gradual structural changes using time 
path variables ht, and assumed the time path follows a proportionally decreasing pattern 
during the structural break period as Ohtani and Katayama (1986) suggested. Eales and 
Unnevehr (1988) used a simple dummy variable to test one-time-only shifts (instant 
intercept shifts only) in the demand curve. The assumption that ht followed a linear path 
for the Korean meat market case is not clear, and the U.S. BSE shock was inferred not to 
cause a gradual change, but to cause an instant change in the Korean meat demands 
(Song and Chae, 2007). This research uses a dummy variable model with intercept 
shifter and slope shifters. The overall and average changes of demand parameters after 
the BSE shock can be detected by slope shifters. If we include two structural change 
dummy variables and seasonal dummy variables to account for the effect of seasonal 
consumption and trend, the equation (1) and (6) will be: 
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(10)   
it
k
ktiktikiktttitii
j
jttijtijijtitiiit
uSDDPyLnDD
pLnDDDDw




)()/()(
)()(
2211
*
2211
22112211


 
(11)   
it
k
ktikktikkikttti
tttittijttij
j
jttijjtijtitiit
uSDSDSPyLnD
PyLnDPyLnpLnD
pLnDpLnDDw





))()(()))/((
)))/(()/(()))((
))(()((
2211
*
22
*
11
*
22
112211



 
 where D1t equals 1 during Jan. 2004-Mar. 2007 when U.S. beef import was banned 
because of BSE, otherwise D1t equals 0. D2t equals 1 after Mar. 2007 when U.S. beef 
import restrictions were disabled, otherwise D2t equals 0. For Model A (a system of 
Korean beef, pork, chicken and U.S. beef), D1t is not meaningful because U.S. beef were 
not imported during Jan. 2004-Mar. 2007. Sk indexes a specific seasonal dummy variable, 
and k denotes each month for monthly data. From this specification the elasticities of (7) 
- (9) will be: 
(12)   Expenditure elasticity:     iiiii wor ))((1 21    
(13)   Uncompensated Own-price elasticity:        
                                                  ))(())((11 2121 iiiiiiiii
i
ii ororw
   
(14)   Uncompensated Cross-price elasticity:  
                                            )()))((())((1 2121 jiw
w
oror
w i
j
iiiijijij
i
ij   . 
 The demand equation for each meat is not independent of others 
( 0),( ji uuCov ), since consumers‟ decisions to purchase a meat inevitably depends on 
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the other meats. Thus, in this study, we estimate the four equations as a system of 
equations. 
 
Testing Statistical Assumptions 
  
To estimate the unbiased, consistent, and efficient estimators of equations (10) 
and (11), some statistical assumptions are needed. The choice of estimation method 
depends on whether those assumptions are satisfied or not. The meaningful and 
important assumptions to choose the estimation method are as follows
2
: 
a. Well defined functional form: there are no serious omitted variable biases; 
b. Normality: the error terms for each equation follow the multivariate normal 
distribution; 
c. No endogeneity: explanatory variables are orthogonal to the error term; 
d. Homoskedasticity: the error terms are not varying over explanatory variables and 
time; 
e. Independence (No Autocorrelation): the error terms are not time varying; 
f. No perfect collinearity: the explanatory variables are not perfectly linear with each 
other, so the explanatory variable vector has full rank. 
                                                 
2
 Besides a-f, McGuirk et al (1993, 1995) included „Parameter Stability‟ which means 
there were no structural breaks. In this study we will include all significant structural 
change dummy variables in the models such as BSE, FMD as explanatory variables 
which are proved by Park, Jin and Bessler (2008). So, we will not test parameter stability 
assumption. Also we will not comment on collinearity because collinearity problem was 
not found anywhere in our model. 
  
12 
1
2
 
 McGuirk et al (MDAH) (1993, 1995) suggested strategies to test the above 
assumptions. MDAH asserted that the assumptions are to be tested jointly for a multi-
equation model, but equation by equation tests would be useful too. We will test above 
assumptions jointly, as well as separately, based on their suggestion. 
 
 Functional Form 
If the functional form to be estimated it is not well defined, there may be some 
omitted variables, causing omitted variable bias. MDAH proposed using the RESET test 
introduced by Ramsey (1969) for equation by equation testing, and they suggested 
multivariate RESET2 and Kolmogorov-Gabor (KG) functional form tests for joint 
equation testing.  
In this study, the RESET test is applied for equation by equation testing for 
equation (10), the level equation. If the level equation is well defined, the first-
differenced form can be assumed to be well defined. Using the potential omitted 
variables such as foot-and-mouth (FMD) disease effect of 2000, 2002, and avian 
influenza (AI) effect of 2003, 2005,  we will test three types of models – type 1: equation 
(10) which considers only the BSE shock, type 2: equation (10) + FMD shock as an 
intercept shifter (dummy variable, Fit=1 if t=Mar. 2000-Sep. 2001 and May 2002-Aug. 
2002, otherwise 0), and type 3: equation (10) + FMD and AI shock as an intercept shifter 
(dummy variable Ait=1 if t=Dec. 2003-Sep. 2004, Dec. 2006-Apr. 2007 and Apr. 2008-
Jul.2008, otherwise 0)
3
.  
                                                 
3
 The period of FMD and AI is from the FMD white paper (MIFAFF, 2003), and the AI 
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Instead of the multivariate RESET2 and KG test for the joint equation testing, the 
three types of joint models above are compared using the Baysian information criteria 
(BIC). Also, equation (10) (level form) and equation (11) (first-differenced form) are 
compared to select the better form for the joint equation. We will test whether the 
interaction terms of BSE shock and seasonality (ρDS) are needed. If ρs are zero, those 
terms (ρDS) are meaningless.  
 Table 1,A. contains the RESET test results of functional form by equations. All 
of the type 1 (only BSE shock is included) equations in Model A, type 2 (BSE and FMD 
included) and type 3 (BSE, FMD, and AI included) equations in Model B are not 
problematic in omitted variable bias based on 5% significance level. The chicken 
equation for type 2 and type 3 in Model A and pork equation for type 1 in Model B are 
suspected of omitted variable bias at the 5% significance level, but not at less than 4% 
level. From the results of joint equation comparison in table 1,B, all interaction terms of 
BSE shock and seasonality are considered to be zero (ρij=0 for all i,j). Also the models 
without ρDS terms are better in BIC for all cases than with ρDS terms. In addition, when 
we exclude ρDS terms, type 2 is the best among all types in BIC for both Model A and 
Model B, and the level form is not much different from the first differenced form in 
terms of BIC.  
This study uses model type 2 without ρDS terms because it has the best BIC. In 
addition, the level form (equation (10)) is applied because it is simpler and does not 
much differ from first differenced form. This changes the model into: 
                                                                                                                                                
white paper (MIFAFF, 2008). The slope shifters of FMD and AI were not significant 
from SUR estimation, so we didn‟t include in the models. 
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(15)       
it
k
kiktttitii
j
jttijtijijtititiiit
uSPyLnDD
pLnDDFMDDDw






)/()(
)()(
*
2211
221132211
. 
 
 Normality 
If we know the exact distribution function of the error term, we can use the MLE 
method which guarantees consistent and the most efficient estimation. MDAH proposed 
the skewness and Kurtosis test of D‟Agostino for equation by equation testing, and Cw
2
 
omnibus test of Mardia and Foster for joint testing. We will apply the normality tests 
suggested by D‟Agostino et al (1990) and Royston (1991) (skewness and kurtosis test), 
Shapiro-Wilk (1965), and Shapiro-Francia (1972) for equation by equation testing. For 
the joint equation test, we will apply the graphical multivariate normality test developed 
by Stevens (1986), Thompson (1990), and Goldstein (1991).  
 For the joint equation test, Mahalanobis distance (MD2), a measure of the 
distance from the mean is defined as: 
(16)  )()(2 1   eeeeMD ttt  
where te is an error term vector of four equations at time t from error term matrix 
)( 21 TeeeE  , )( 21 TeeeE  is a mean matrix of E, and   is a variance-covariance 
matrix of E, (
1
)()(


T
EEEE
) (Mahalanobis, 1936, Velleman and Welsch, 1981). If 
te follows a multivariate normal distribution, MD2 follows the chi-square distribution. 
The probability corresponding to MD2j (Prob(χT
2≥ MD2j)) can be approximated by the 
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rank of ascending order of MD2j such as 
T
rank j 5.0
1

  under the null hypothesis of 
multivariate normality. If we calculate the chi-square value (chi2j) corresponding to the 
approximated probability (Prob(χT
2≥ chi2j)= 
T
rank j 5.0
1

 ), MD2-chi2 plot will show 
one-to-one matching on a 45 degree line.  
 Table 2,A. contains the equation by equation test results of normality. All 
equations except chicken‟s demand function in Model A do not clearly satisfy the 
normality assumption. Figure 3 shows that MD2-chi2 plots are not on a 45 degree line. 
Table 2,B. contains the Hotelling‟s T2 test results of comparing two series (MD2t, chi2t). 
Because the vector of variance is considered not to be the same, we can conclude the two 
series are not the same. Thus, we cannot assume normality, and will not use the MLE 
method. 
 
Endogeneity 
If some explanatory variables are not exogenous, OLS estimation cannot 
guarantee consistent estimators. In this case, instrumental variable (IV) regression 
should be used to minimize the endogeneity problems. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) test is applied to check for an endogeneity problem for all potential endogenous 
variables (ln(pit), and ln(yt/P
*
t)). The test is for each level equation of (13), because if 
endogeneity is not problematic in each level equation, we can assume it is not 
problematic in the joint level equations and the first-differenced form. For the 
endogeneity test, we will use AI shock, the consumer price index (CPI), gross domestic 
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final consumption expenditure (FCE), a price index of livestock feeds paid by farmers 
(FPI), lagged dependent variables (wit-1), lagged independent variables (ln(pit-1), and 
ln(yt-1/P
*
t-1)), and quantity consumed (qit) as IVs. To test the appropriateness of IVs, the 
partial R
2
 proposed by Shea (1997) is applied, along with the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) 
rank Lagrange multiplier (KPrkLM) statistic and Hansen‟s (1982) J statistic (Baum and 
Schaffer, 2007, Baum et al, 2003)
4
. 
 The test results contained in Table 3,A. indicate that the IVs are highly correlated 
to the potential endogenous variables. Shea‟s Partial R2s from the auxiliary regression 
for potential endogenous variables with IVs are all near one, so the IVs are well suited 
for potential endogenous variables. The rejection of the null hypothesis of under 
identification from KPrkLM statistic shows that the matrix QXZ = E(Xi Z´i) has full 
column rank where Xi is the explanatory variable matrix from the original regression 
yi=Xiβ+ui, and Zi is the IV matrix (Baum et al, 2003). From those results, we can 
confirm that the IVs used to test endogeneity here are relevant to the potential 
endogenous variables. Hansen‟s J statistic in Table 3,B. shows that the null hypothesis 
of orthogonality between IVs and error term cannot be rejected. So, the test results in 
Table 3,A. and 3,B. show that IVs used in this study are well defined. DWH test results 
in Table 3,C. show that the null hypothesis of exogenous IVs cannot be rejected for all 
equations which means that the IV regressions are not systematically different from the 
original regressions
5
. This result confirms that the IVs are not needed. 
                                                 
4
 Also see ivreg2.hlp in STATA journal on line (available at http://www.stata-
journal.com/software/sj7-4/st0030_3/ivreg2.hlp). 
5
 Here, we compare IV regression with SUR regression. 
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 Homoskedasticity, Independence 
If the error terms in equation (15) are not homoskedastistic or serially correlated, 
OLS regression cannot guarantee efficient estimators. In that case „Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS)‟ estimation is one of the best alternatives. To test static homoskedasticity 
by equations, the Breusch and Pagan (1979) and Cook and Weisberg (1983) tests are 
used. For dynamic homoskedasticity, the ARCH LM test suggested by Engel (1982) is 
applied. To test for serial correlation, the general dynamic autocorrelation test method 
developed by Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978) is employed. Also, the Ljung-Box Q 
test is used to check for white noise. For the joint equation testing, the multivariate 
Ljung-Box Q test can be used. If the homoskedasticity and independence in equation 
(15) are problematic, the GLS will be applied to equations (15). 
 Table 4 contains the homoskedasticity and independence test results. Even if 
multivariate Ljung-Box Q test results verify that the error terms from joint equation 
models are white noise, the equation by equation test results (Table 4.A) show that we 
cannot be sure that the error terms are homoskedasticitic and independent. Thus the GLS 
estimation method for equations (15) is employed. 
 
Model Specification and Estimation Method 
Based on the test results above, equations (15) are analyzed. All equations are 
estimated as a whole (one equation will be dropped for the adding-up restrictions) using 
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SUR estimation with the GLS method without IV. Then, demand elasticities are 
calculated with equations (7)-(9), and (12)-(14). 
Data 
 
 The data used in this study are monthly data from 1996 to 2008. Price data are 
retail price (Korean won) per kg. The retail price data of Korean beef, pork, and chicken 
are obtained from the KAMIS (Korea Agricultural Marketing Information System) 
database provided by KAFTC (Korean Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation). The retail 
prices of beef and pork are announced by grades and parts. In this study, the price of 
third grade beef (mostly rump part) for bulgogi (Korean barbecue) and pork belly for 
samgyupsal (Korean grilled bacon) are used as representative prices because those parts 
are the most commonly used in Korea. 
The quantity consumed data are yearly data downloaded from NACF (National 
Agricultural Cooperatives Federation). The monthly data are estimated by a calculated 
monthly slaughtered head ratio (number of heads slaughtered a month divided by 
number of heads slaughtered a year). The number of head slaughtered per month is from 
MIFAFF (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries).  
Because imported U.S. beef retail prices are not officially reported anywhere 
(KAFTC reports them only after 2007), the reported prices to the Korean customs office 
were downloaded from the KATI (Korean Agricultural Trade Information) database 
provided by KAFTC. The yearly quantity consumed for all imported beef data are 
obtained from MIFAFF. Monthly consumption levels of all imported beef are estimated 
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by the yearly consumption level multiplied by the ratio of the quantity imported for the 
month and the quantity imported for the year (the quantity consumed in the month = the 
quantity consumed in the year × (the quantity imported in the month / the quantity 
imported in the year)). Because only the total consumption level of all imported beef is 
reported, the consumption level of U.S. beef is estimated by the quantity consumed of all 
imported beef multiplied by the ratio of the quantity imported from the U.S. and the 
quantity imported from all countries (the U.S. beef consumption = all imported beef 
consumption × (the quantity imported from the U.S. / the quantity imported from all 
countries)). The import quantity data are from the KATI database. The CPI, FPI, and 
FCE used to test endogeneity come from the KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information 
System) provided by Statistics Korea. FMD and AI data are obtained from MIFAFF. 
 
Testing Restrictions 
 
Estimating a complete demand system by using total expenditures (y) and 
expenditure share (w) data in a LA/AIDS model allows for the imposition of adding-up 
restrictions. Those restrictions can reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, and 
thus relieve the degree of freedom problem, because the fourth equation is automatically 
estimated by only estimating three equations. Adding-up restrictions on equations (15) 
will be: 
 (17)   Adding-up    

     


i
ik
i i i i i i
iijiiiji 00,0,  0,β0,1,α
,0

. 
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 Homogeneity and Symmetry 
If consumers adjust their consumption decisions instantaneously when prices and 
income change, homogeneity and symmetry conditions hold. However, in the real world 
it takes time for consumers to adjust to the changes (Henneberry and Hwang, 2007). If 
homogeneity and symmetry conditions hold, the degree of freedom problem is also 
highly relieved. So, we test homogeneity and symmetry first to decide whether these 
restrictions can be imposed on equations (15). 
 If homogeneity and symmetry hold in equations (15), the following restrictions 
should hold: 
(18)   Homogeneity   
j
0,ij  
j
ij 01 ,  
j
ij 02  
(19)   Symmetry         jiij   ,  jiij 11   , jiij 22     (for all i, j, i≠j). 
 Table 5 shows the Wald test results for homogeneity and symmetry. From the 
results, the null hypothesis of homogeneity and symmetry for both Model A and Model 
B are rejected at the 1% significance level. 
 
 Separability 
Moschini, Moro, and Green (1994) indicated that many previous studies just 
assumed weak separability of demand systems, and did not test for separability 
(Moschini and Meilke, 1989). However, separability should be tested before estimating 
demand systems, because if some goods are not separable, the goods should not be 
treated as one good as a whole even if the goods can be categorized as one group 
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conceptually (Moschini, Moro, and Green, 1994, Henneberry and Hwang, 2007). 
Because each meat (beef, pork, chicken, U.S. beef, respectively) in this study is 
indivisible (lower level price data are not reported), the separability of each meat cannot 
be tested, and thus the separability of each meat is inevitably assumed. Instead, we will 
test whether each meat can be aggregated and treated as one good as a group with others 
by the concept of separability.  
The original concept of separable utility requires that the marginal rate of 
substitution between two goods is independent of the consumption of the other goods, 
but marginal utilities in most cases are not observable, so empirical testing of 
separability is problematic (Nayga and Capps, 1994). Many studies suggested testing 
equations for separability (Moschini, Moro, and Green, 1994, Eales and Unnevehr, 1998, 
Sellen and Goddard, 1998, Nayga and Capps, 1994). In this study, we apply Moschini, 
Moro, and Green‟s suggestion. They showed the conditions for direct weak separability 
as: 
(20)   
mj
ki
jm
ik




  
where i, j are in the same commodity group, k,m are in the same commodity group 
different from the group i, j are in (i=j, k=m are possible). ζij denotes Allen-Uzawa 
elasticity of substitution which is the ratio of the compensated cross-price elasticity and 
expenditure share. For equation (13) of an AIDS model, equation (18) is changed into: 
(21)   
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 Table 6 contains the summary statistics of the each meat‟s observed market share. 
Table 7 shows the non-linear Wald test results of separability at the mean value of 
observed market share ( w ) in table 6. The test results indicate that every kind of meat 
should not be aggregated with others, so meat product as a group including Korean beef, 
pork, chicken and U.S. beef is not separable. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Table 8 contains the estimated model evaluation indicators. All demand 
equations for both Model A and Model B fit the observed data well. R
2
s of all equations 
are over 0.83 and RMSEs are all less than 0.031. Tables 9.A and 9.B contain the 
estimated coefficients for model A and model B. From these results, the affects of BSE 
in the U.S in late 2003 can be tested. Table 10 contains the test results. Comparing 
period 1 (before Dec. 2003) with period 3 (after Mar. 2007) in Model A (period 2 (Jan. 
2004-Mar. 2007) are not included in Model A), the intercept change is not significant (p-
value is 0.2306), but slope shifters with respect to prices and expenditure are all 
significant (all p-values are almost zero). For Model B the intercept and slope shifters 
from period 1 to period 2 are all significant (all p-values are almost zero). Comparing 
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period 1 with period 3 in Model B, changes are significant overall (p-value is 0.0238), 
but intercept and price shifters are not significant (p-values are 0.5399 and 0.0809, 
respectively) at the 5% significance level. So, we can confirm that the BSE effects are 
significant overall for both Model A and Model B. However, the seasonal consumption 
trends proved not to be changed by the discovery of BSE in the U.S. in late 2003. As we 
see in Table 1.B, seasonal consumption pattern changes are zero for both Model A (p-
value is 0.0816) and Model B (p-value is 0.6653) when we include ρDS in type II 
equations. The results suggest that the monthly meat consumption pattern is so stable 
that it is not easily changed. 
 The Korean monthly meat consumption pattern can be traced by the estimated 
coefficients (θ) of seasonal dummy variables in Table 9. The negative sign of θik in a 
specific month k for the i-th equation means that the meat i is consumed less in month k 
than in the base month (January in this study, θJan=0). Inversely, a positive sign for θik 
means more consumption in month k than in the base month. The estimated θ for both 
Model A and Model B in Table 9 shows Korean beef is consumed more in January and 
September. The reason is because beef is expensive relative to other kinds of meats, so it 
is consumed more in the special holiday season (Sollal: lunar new years‟ day in late 
January or early February, and Chusok: full moon‟s day celebrating good harvest in 
September). The U.S. beef variable in Model A shows a seasonal consumption pattern 
similar to Korean beef. Chicken is consumed more during the summer season (May-
Aug.). It can be explained by the long Korean tradition of eating samgyetang (chicken 
soup boiled with ginseng and other herbs) as a tonic food during the summer.  
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Pork is consumed more during the period of spring (Mar.-May) and winter (Oct.-
Dec.) when the consumption of other kinds of meats is relatively less. Pork consumption 
in the spring has been increasing in recent years. The market share of pork in March-
May was around 50% in 1997, but grew to about 66% by 2007. Increased spring pork 
consumption is related to the wind carrying yellow dust from China in the spring causing 
respiratory ailments, which has increased since the late 1990s. Korean traditional 
medicine suggests pork as a treatment for dust leading Koreans to increase their spring 
pork consumption.  
 The Marshallian demand and expenditure elasticities using the estimated 
coefficients in Table 9 are reported in Table 11.  We can check the structural demand 
changes attributable to the 2003 U.S. BSE case by comparing the elasticities of period 1, 
period 2 and period 3. 
 First, expenditure elasticities are all positive and significant which means all 
meat products are normal goods. The expenditure elasticities of Korean beef changed 
from 1.2476 (period 1) to 1.0082 (period 3) in Model A, and from 1.1392 (period 1) to 
1.4002 (period 2) and 1.0106 (period 3) in Model B. The U.S. beef expenditure elasticity 
was highly elastic to a budget change in period 1 (2.1992), but most notably it was less 
elastic in period 3 (1.0678). The expenditure elasticity of pork decreased in period 2, but 
it recovered in period 3 to slightly greater than the level of period 1 (Model A: 0.8594 → 
0.9932, Model B: 0.9875 → 0.7485 → 0.9955). The expenditure elasticity of chicken 
increased significantly (Model A: 0.5322 → 0.8772, Model B: 0.5653 → 1.2153 → 
0.9910). From these results, we support the contention that Korean consumers will 
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increase pork and chicken consumption more (U.S. beef less) after the U.S. BSE case as 
their budgets increase. The U.S. BSE case in 2003 has contributed to changes in Korean 
consumers‟ preferences from U.S. beef to chicken. 
 Second, own price elasticities are all negative except chicken in period 1 in 
Model A. Marshallian elasticities are uncompensated, so they can be positive. The 
positive own price elasticity says the good may be an inferior good, even a Giffen‟s 
good. However, the estimated own price elasticity of chicken in Model A is not 
significant (p-value is 0.5094), so we cannot be sure chicken is an inferior good. The 
own price elasticity of Korean beef decreased in period 2, and recovered (but not 
significant) in period 3 (Model A: -1.0272 → -0.6794, Model B: -0.9450 → -0.4226 →  
-0.7834). This result means that beef is no longer a luxury good as Korean consumers‟ 
quality and safety perception of beef changed due to the U.S. BSE case, and that 
consumers‟ decision on beef consumption is less dependent on beef price after U.S. BSE 
case. The price elasticity of pork became more inelastic in period 2, and it recovered to 
the similar level of period 1 (Model A: -0.4358 → -0.6482, Model B: -0.5715 → -0.4143 
→ -0.5422). The price elasticity of chicken was near zero (not significant) in period 1. In 
period 2 and period 3 it was still inelastic, but it became more elastic than in period 1. 
That means consumers‟ quality and safety recognition of chicken improved after the U.S. 
BSE case. The own price elasticity for U.S. beef became more elastic in period 3 relative 
to period 1 (Model A: -0.4636 → -1.1379). It looks strange because logically it should 
be less elastic after the U.S. BSE case. This change can be explained by the Korean 
consumption structure of U.S. beef after the BSE case. During 2004-2006, U.S. beef 
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imports were totally banned. Only after Mar. 2007, U.S. beef began to be imported, but 
still the quantity imported was very small (2003: 170,799 ton → 2007: 13,108 ton). 
Furthermore, the number of buyers was very small in 2007, and mostly they were not 
individual consumers, but restaurant chains or food manufacturing companies with 
highly price elastic demand
6
. 
 Third, we examined the changing relationship among Korean beef, pork, and 
chicken. Because Marshallian demand elasticity is uncompensated, and we do not 
impose symmetry restrictions, it is ambiguous in many cases whether one is a substitute 
or a complement for other meats. Whether two goods are substitutes or complements to 
each other in terms of Marshallian price elasticity depends on the relative contribution to 
consumption changes from the income effect and price effect. If the price effect is 
greater, two goods are substitutes for each other, but if the income effect is greater, two 
goods can be complements.  
Korean beef was a complement to pork as the price of pork changed in period 1. 
The complementarity in period 2 got stronger, but in period 3 it is weaker than in period 
1 (εKor beef, pork in Model A: -0.8021 → -0.4643, Model B: -0.7215 → -1.1022→ -0.5979). 
Pork was a weak complement to Korean beef as the price of Korean beef changed in 
period 1. However after the U.S. BSE case, the complementarity became insignificant. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero elasticity (εpork, Kor beef) in period 3. When 
chicken price changed, Korean beef was a complement to chicken in period 1 (εAKor 
                                                 
6
 See the newspaper article (May 29. 2008) by Hyunsoo Kim (available at 
http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/industry/200805/e2008052917543247670.htm). 
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beef,chicken: -0.3406, ε
B
Kor beef,chicken: -0.2128), but  chicken was a substitute for Korean beef 
when the price of Korean beef changed in period 1 ((εAchicken,Kor beef: 0.2720, ε
B
chicken,Kor 
beef: 0.2348). However after the BSE case, the cross price elasticities between Korean 
beef and chicken are not significant (p-values are all greater than 6%). The cross price 
relationship between pork and chicken were not significant with price changes in period 
1 (p-values are all greater than 12%). The complementarity between pork and chicken 
was still inelastic but got stronger after the BSE case (εpork, chicken : 0.0523 → -0.3389 
(Model A), -0.0264 → -0.2326 → -0.3291 (Model B), εchicken ,pork : -0.1456 → -0.7594 
(Model A), -0.2188 → 0.1349 → -0.8801 (Model B)). Thus we can say that the BSE 
case made the cross price relationship between Korean beef and pork (or chicken) 
insignificant, but made the complementary relationship between pork and chicken 
stronger. We can infer the changes of cross price elasticities are caused by the U.S. BSE 
case. Korean beef consumers came to put more emphasis on food safety or quality than 
the price changes of related goods. 
 The fourth is the relationship between the U.S. beef and other meats. Before the 
BSE case, U.S. beef was a substitute for Korean beef, and a complement to pork and 
chicken. However, the cross price relationship between U.S. beef and others are not 
significant in period 3 (p-values are all above 25% except ε U.S. beef, chkcken=1.9208). This 
result suggests that for U.S. beef consumers (mostly restaurant chains and food 
manufacturers) in period 3, the price of related goods are not significant factors in 
deciding U.S. beef consumption.  
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Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
In summary, we estimated a LA/AIDS model to analyze the structural changes in 
Korean meat demands caused by an outbreak of BSE in the U.S. in 2003. Using recently 
developed model specification testing methods, we specified the empirical model, and 
estimated the model with a SUR-GLS estimation method.  
 The estimation results show that Korean meat demands changed significantly 
after the embargo on U.S. beef in Dec. 2003. The demand for Korean beef and U.S. beef 
has been changed to be less elastic to budget than before. On the contrary, pork and 
chicken demands have changed to be more elastic to budget. Korean beef has changed to 
be less Marshallian own price elastic or not significant after 2003, but pork and chicken 
have changed to be more elastic. This result for U.S. beef is because the beef imports 
from U.S. were small in 2007 relative to the quantity imported in 2003, and most of the 
imported U.S. beef was consumed by the highly price elastic food industries. So, the 
Marshallian own price elasticity of U.S. beef was greater after the BSE case than before 
2004. The cross price elasticities of Korean beef and U.S. beef with pork and chicken 
became insignificant after the BSE case. We can infer that all those changes come from 
food security concerns for beef caused by the outbreak of BSE in the U.S. in 2003 and 
the import embargo by Korea. So the food safety concern made Korean consumers 
change their meat consumption structure from beef to pork or chicken, and made beef 
consumption less elastic to budget and prices.  
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 These results suggest that food safety concerns and policies are likely to have far 
reaching impacts. The effects of a multiple year embargo of a U.S. food product or 
commodity has the potential for increasing demand for domestic foods and creating 
demand resistance to U.S. commodities once the embargo is lifted. The results from the 
U.S. beef embargo by Korea suggest that U.S. beef promotion efforts need to be 
expanded greatly to offset the effects of the demand changes that occurred.  
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CHAPTER III 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES OF NATURAL GAS SUPPLY CAUSED BY 
TECHNOLOGY CHANGES AND DEPLETION 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
Natural gas is becoming more important as an energy source because it is one of 
the cleanest, safest, and most useful of all energy sources (NGAS: Natural Gas Supply 
Association, available at http://www.naturalgas.org). Natural gas production grew 
rapidly until the early 1970‟s when supply decreased until the mid 1980‟s when supply 
began increasing (Figure 4). NGSA accuses the U.S. government regulation policy for 
the supply decline and price irregularity. In 2008, dry natural gas
7
 made up 28% of 
primary energy production (EIA: Energy Information Administration – Annul Energy 
Outlook 2010), but EIA projected that it will decrease gradually to 26% by 2030 (Figure 
5). Natural gas provided 22 percent of total energy consumed in the U.S. in 2005 (EIA – 
Annual Energy Outlook 2007).  
In the past 20 to 30 years, the environment around the natural gas production has 
been changing. The changes are mostly due to policy changes, technology development, 
and depletion of reserves (NGSA, Cuddington and Moss, 1996). First, the policy for 
                                                 
7
 Usually the extracted natural gas is wet at first. The wet natural gas (free gas or gas in 
solution with crude oil) contains liquefiable hydrocarbon (methane, ethane, propane, 
butane, etc.) and any volumes of non-hydrocarbon gases (water vapor, nitrogen, 
carbondioxide, hydrogen sulfide etc.). Dry natural gas is made from wet natural gas by 
removing the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon gases. 
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energy market has been heading for deregulation (NGAS, available at 
http://www.naturalgas.org). Because of the natural monopoly problem, interstate sales 
and delivery of natural gas, and building an interstate pipeline was controlled by the FPC 
(Federal Power Commission) based on the Natural Gas Act of 1938. After the Supreme 
Courts decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin case in 1954, FPC oversighted 
over wellhead price. However, after experiencing the supply shortages in the late 1970‟s, 
the federal government began to allow market forces to set wellhead prices and sales 
(The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, FERC Order No. 436 and 636, The Natural Gas 
Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989). Now, the regulations by FERC are focused on only 
the sales of natural gas from interstate pipeline companies to local distribution 
companies. 
Second, technology of finding, drilling, storing, transporting, and distributing 
natural gas has been greatly developed. The technology development has played a role in 
reducing the production cost of natural gas. For example, 3-D and 4-D seismic imaging 
technology made it easy to explore gas reserves. Coiled tubing, slimhole drilling, and 
offshore drilling technology reduced the cost of drilling. CO2-sand fracturing technology 
enabled producers to extract more from underground formations. Liquefying technology 
of natural gas reduced the storing costs, and the technology of natural gas powered fuel 
cells made it possible to generate electricity more efficiently (NGAS, available at 
http://www.naturalgas.org). In addition to the well known big changes above, there were 
many other technology developments in natural gas production. Cuddington and Moss 
(1996) summarized the diffusion of computer technology in natural gas production. 
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Third, the problem of depletion in natural gas reserves is controversial. NGSA 
insists that natural gas is not running out quickly, and that there is much remaining. 
However, some communities or research groups like “The Oil Drum” claim that 
conventional (relatively easy to produce) gas depletes fast, and unconventional gas (deep 
sea gas, tight gas, gas-containing shales, coal bed methane, arctic & subsea methane and 
so on) is hard to find and costly. Furthermore, they argue that there is a treadmill effect 
which means drilling more to stay at current consumption levels requires more costs for 
finding new reservoirs and producing it even if technology reduces production costs 
(Nate Hagens, 2006
8
). The world proven natural gas reserve was estimated to be about 
6,183 trillion cubic feet (tcf) by EIA (Oil & Gas journal, 2006), and the world‟s original 
endowment of conventional gas was estimated to be 10,000 tcf by Bently (2002). Bently 
(2002) indicated that the depletion of conventional gas is not problematic now, but as the 
dependency on oil as an energy source decreases and consumption of natural gas 
increases, the production of conventional gas production will be at its peak in perhaps 20 
years. Raymond, the CEO of EXXON Mobil in 2005, told reporters at the Reuters 
Energy Summit in 2005 that the North American natural gas production had already 
peaked, and it would continue to decline
9
. Reynolds (2009) forecasted that the North 
American natural gas production will be at its peak in 2013. 
 Since there were many previous studies about the effect of deregulation policy on 
the natural gas market (MacAvoy, 2000), the primary objective of this study is to 
quantify the effects of technology changes and depletion on the U.S. natural gas supply. 
                                                 
8
 Available at http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/11/8/6636/36918 
9
 Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/Utilities/idUSN2163310420050621 
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To achieve the objective, I will estimate the supply function for natural gas including the 
effects of depletion in natural gas reservoirs and technological development. The 
estimated supply function will be used to analyze the changes of supply elasticities 
caused by the effects of technology change and depletion. 
 
Literature Review 
 
 There are many studies about estimating the supply of natural gas, but most of 
the studies did not explicitly take into consideration the effects of technology changes 
and depletion. Early studies were focused on the effects of regulatory policy on the price 
responsiveness of new discoveries of natural gas. Erickson and Spann (1971) estimated 
the new discoveries and drilling function of natural gas using Fisher‟s (1964) model. 
They found the new drilling and new discoveries depends on economic incentives such 
as wellhead prices, but the price responsiveness is lower than expected because of 
regulatory policies. Khazzom (1971) estimated a new discovery function for natural gas 
using ceiling price (policy price), price of oil, and price of gas liquids. He recognized the 
possibility of under or over estimating the price responsiveness caused by the effects of 
technology development and depletion, but he did not find conclusive evidence of the 
effects of technology development and depletion on the price responsiveness with the 
1960‟s data. MacAvoy and Pindyck (1973) also estimated the new discoveries function 
for natural gas, and found that the shortage of natural gas supply was due to the low 
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wellhead ceiling prices. Pindyck (1974) and Walls (2002) summarized the 
methodologies and results of the previous studies. 
 Recently, Cuddington and Moss (1996, 2001) analyzed the effects of technology 
change and depletion on the cost of natural gas and the U.S. petroleum industry. They 
used proxy variables: a technology diffusion index for technology changes and past 
cumulative production level for depletion. By using two proxy variables, they captured 
the effects of technology changes and depletion separately. They found the cost 
reduction effects of technology development have largely offset the cost increasing 
effects of depletion. 
 The classical literature for modeling the supply of depletable resources with 
technology development focused on finding the dynamic optimal production path. 
Hotelling (1931) first developed the dynamic optimization model of exhaustible resource. 
However, Hotelling assumed a fixed technology level (constant marginal cost), so the 
later empirical work failed to support Hotelling‟s model (Barnett and Morse, 1963, Slade, 
1982). Smith (1968) and Pindyck (1978) also developed a dynamic model of 
nonrenewable natural resources with allowing technology changes. Smith suggested an 
optimal dynamic supply model including the capital stock invested. Pindyck included 
the average production cost changes by technology changes and he showed that the 
optimal exploratory activity for finding new reserved of depletable resources depends 
not only on initial reserves and rate of depletion but also change of extraction cost. 
 Productivity growth by technology development has been mostly gradual and 
smooth since the 1970‟s (Baumol, 1986, Krugman, 1995, 1996, Phillips, 2001). So, the 
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empirical methods to detect the gradual effect of technology changes focused on how to 
estimate time-varying coefficients. There are two types of models to test time-varying 
coefficients (Chen and Hong, 2008). One is a parametric smooth transition regression 
(STR) which assumes a specific functional form of time-varying coefficients, and the 
other is a nonparametric approach which does not assume a specific form. Ohtani and 
Katayama (1986) and Moschini and Mielke (1989) assumed the coefficients are varying 
linearly over time. Lin and Teräsvirta (1994), Teräsvirta (1994), and Holt and Balagtas 
(2009) assumed a logistic functional form. Since the functional form assumption in an 
STR model is rather arbitrary, the nonparametric method is better in terms of fewer 
restrictions. Robinson (1989, 1991) first applied the nonparametric method to the 
structural change model. Orbe, Ferreira and Rodriguez-Poo (2000, 2005, 2006), Cai 
(2007), and Cai, Li and Park (2009) developed the model later. They used the 
nonparametric method of local linear or local polynomial fitting methods developed by 
Fan and Gijbels (1996). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 If we assume the output level of natural gas extraction at time t (qt) is a function 
of labor inputs (L), capital inputs (K), technology level (tech), and given depletion level 
(dep), the production function of natural gas is defined as: 
(22)   ),,( ttttt deptechKLfq  . 
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In many macro level analyses, R&D investment was used as a proxy variable for 
techt (Solow, 1957, Romer, 1990, Griliches, 1994), but R&D investment for a specific 
industry is hard to get. Furthermore, R&D investment may not always be correlated with 
technology changes (Cuddington and Moss, 1996, 2001). Cuddington and Moss (1996, 
2001) used actual technology diffusion as a proxy variable for techt. However, industry 
level actual technology diffusion data are also hard to estimate. So, in this study, a time 
varying coefficients model will be applied to capture the effects of technology changes 
which are assumed to be gradual as Phillips (2002) and Krugman (1996) supported. The 
dynamic decision of the industry production with respect to the depletion of natural gas 
can be captured by total initial endowment ( Q ) minus past cumulative production 
( 


1
0
t
s
sq ). Because Q is not known, 
1
1
0
)( 



t
s
st qD  will be used as a proxy variable for 
dept as Cuddington and Moss (1996, 2001) suggested. If we apply the Cobb-Douglas 
type flexible functional form, the production function of natural gas will be 
(23)   ttt
ttttt DKLq
321  . 
 Because of the difficulty in obtaining the labor inputs (Lt) and capital inputs (Kt) 
data , the supply function will be used to analyze the effects of technology changes and 
depletion. The supply function can be derived from the profit maximization assumption. 
The profit maximization problem will be: 
(24)   ttttttt
KL
KrLwqpmax
tt

,
 
where pt is the unit price of natural gas. The price pt is actually the expected price of 
producers when they make the supply decision. Because the import and export of natural 
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gas in the U.S. is free and the futures and option market of natural gas in the U.S. are 
well developed, we assume the rational producers can expect pt on average. So, we 
assume pt is given in this study. Then from the first order condition we can get the 
derived input demand function: 
(25)   
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If we replace Lt and Kt in the production function (equation (23)) with the derived input 
demand function (equation (25)), then we can get the supply function of U.S. natural 
gas: 
(26)   
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In equation (26) the restriction –bt-ct=dt means the supply function derived from a profit 
maximization assumption satisfies the „homogeneous of degree zero in prices‟ condition.  
Using the estimated coefficients, we can calculate the time-varying supply 
elasticities (bt, ct are the supply elasticities of input prices and dt is the supply elasticity 
of output price).  If we assume the technology level does not change when time period 
changes from period zero to one, the input price elasticity is usually negative because the 
level of the input decreases when marginal cost of input (input price) increases. However, 
if we take the technology development into account, the input price elasticity can be 
positive because technology development causes the marginal product of the input to 
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increase. Figure 6 shows the relationship between technology change and input level 
change. In Figure 6, VMP (value of marginal product = output price × marginal product) 
is the input demand curve, and PI (input price) is marginal cost. Assume input demand is 
VMP0 with technology level tech0, and marginal cost is P0 at period zero, the 
equilibrium input level is I0, and production level is q0=f(I0) (f is the production 
function). If the input price rises to P1 in period one and technology level does not 
change, input demand remains VMP0(tech0), input level decreases to I ,´ and production 
level decreases to q1=f(I )´. If technology level increased from tech0 to tech1 and input 
price increased to P1, the input demand will change to VMP1(tech1), and the input level 
will decrease to I1 and output level will also decrease to q1=f(I1)  because the marginal 
product increasing effect of technology development is less than the marginal cost 
increasing effect of the input price rise. However, if the technology level increased the 
input demand to VMP1(tech2), input and output levels will increase to I2 and q1=f(I2), 
even if the input price rises from P0 to P1 because the marginal product increasing effect 
of technology development is greater than the marginal cost increasing effect of the 
input price rise. Thus, we can infer that the value of input price elasticities (bt and ct) are 
decided by the relative size of the marginal product increasing effect of technology 
development and the marginal cost increasing effect of input price increases. 
One more thing we should remember is that the growth of marginal product by 
technology development does not always mean the growth of average production which 
is usually referred to as a productivity growth. Figure 7 shows the relationship among 
technology change, average product, and marginal product. When the production 
  
39 
3
9
 
function q is f0 with technology level tech0, and if  the producer‟s input/output decision 
is E0(I0, q0) at period zero, the average product is q0/I0 and marginal product is MP0. 
When the production function q is changed to f1 by the technology development and if 
the producer‟s input/output decision is E1(I1, q1) at period one, both average product and 
marginal product increase to q1/I1 (greater than q0/I0) and MP1 (greater than MP0). 
However, if producer‟s input/output decision is E2(I2, q2), marginal product increases 
(MP2>MP0) but average product decreases (q0/I0> q2/I2), because input use increases 
from I0 to I2 (Figure 7). 
 
Incorporating Time-varying Coefficients 
 
To estimate a supply function with time-varying coefficients, two models can be 
applied – STR model and nonparametric local polynomial (NLP) model. Even if the 
NLP model is better in terms of imposing fewer assumptions, it does not provide the 
coefficients for every time point (T) but for each band because the NLP model divides 
the whole time period into multiple bands which are not always the same as T. The STR 
model estimates the time-varying coefficients at every time point by using an assumed 
functional form. The STR model will be used in this study. If we express the supply 
function derived in (26) in matrix form, it will be changed to 
(27)   )(),lnlnlnln1(),(ln, tttttttttttttttt edcbaDprwXqQXQ   . 
 STR model suggested by Lin and Teräsvirta (1994) assumes )(21 tFt   , 
and also assumed the logistic functional form of F(t). So the model will be: 
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Various functional forms of F(t) can be applied, but in this study first, second, and third 
order logistic functions will be tested based on Lin and Teräsvirta (1994), and the best 
form will be chosen by BIC. 
 On estimation of equation (28) there may be a identification problem. If γ→0, δi 
cannot be identified (Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994). To avoid this problem, first order Taylor 
expansion is used. Then the function F(t) will be 
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Using equation (29), the supply function in equation (26) of third order logistic 
functional form can be expressed as: 
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For the second order form, (a3, b3, c3, d3, e3) are zero, and for the first order form, (a2, b2, 
c2, d2, e2) are also zero. 
 
Data, Empirical Model, and Method 
 
Monthly data from 1976 to 2009 are used in this study. U.S. natural gas wellhead 
price (cents per million cubic feet) and U.S. natural gas marketed production (million 
cubic feet) data are used, and are obtained from the EIA database. Wage (dollar per 
hour) data come from employment, hours, and earnings from the current employment 
statistics survey by BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). It is the national level average 
hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees in the oil and gas 
extraction industry. Interest rate (percent) data are from the FRB (Federal Reserve 
Board) database. The rates are average corporate bond rates of Moody‟s Aaa industrial 
bond. 
 Because the supply function in equation (30) has a non-linear functional form 
and a non-linear restriction, OLS (ordinary least squares) method by linearization may 
bear a bias and non-efficiency problem. NLS (non linear least squares) method is used in 
this study. To analyze the time-varying effects and to compare NLS with OLS, four 
models are estimated. The models are as follows. 
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Because the data are monthly, seasonal dummy variables (St=1 for a specific month, 
otherwise zero) are included in the models. Four models in equation (10) will be 
estimated and compared, and the best model will be chosen based on BIC. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Table 12 contains the evaluation results of the four models in equation (10). The 
results show that Model 4 (the third order exponential form of STR model) is the best. 
Model 4 fits the historical data well (R
2
=0.8342), RMSE is the smallest (0.0312), and 
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BIC is also smallest (-1544.876). So Model 4 is used to estimate time-varying 
coefficients. 
 Table 13 shows the estimation results for Model 1 and Model 4. From the results, 
we can confirm that the assumption of time-varying coefficients is significant. All time 
varying coefficients except a2, b2, and d2 (a0, b0, c0, e0 are not time-varying factors) are 
significant at the 5% significance level. Monthly supply patterns estimated in Model 4 
are all significant, and they are almost the same pattern as found in Model 1. During the 
winter season natural gas is supplied more (intercept shifter for January is 0, December 
is -0.0195) and in September it is supplied less (intercept shifter of September is  
-0.1084).  
 Labor price (wage) elasticity of U.S. natural gas supply in Model 1 is fixed (E
w
1= 
0.1809, Table 13), but the time-varying labor price elasticity estimated in Model 4 (E
w
t) 
increased smoothly for 1976-2009 (Figure 8). The elasticity was negative until May 
2004. This result indicates that the marginal product increasing effect of technology 
development is growing steadily, but it was not greater than the cost (labor price) 
increasing effect. As explained in Figure 6, the negative elasticity means the change 
from E0 to E1. We can confirm this result by the fact that the average productivity of 
labor index
10
 (Table 14) steadily increased until 2003. That is the case of changing from 
E0 to E1 in Figure 7. After May 2004, E
w
t changed to positive and keep increasing even 
though the productivity of labor (average product of labor) was decreasing (Table 14). 
The positive elasticity means that the marginal product increasing effect of technology 
                                                 
10
 Source: BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) data base. Available at 
http://www.bls.gov/lpc/ . 
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development was greater than the labor cost increasing effect after May 2004 as we see 
the change from E0 to E2 in Figure 6. As explained in Figure 7, the decreasing average 
product of labor after May 2004 is the case of changing from E0 to E2. We can confirm 
these results based on the increasing number of employees in oil and gas extraction 
industry, number of gas and gas condensate wells, and drilling activity (number of crude 
oil and natural gas rotary rigs)
11
 after 2003 (Table 14).  
 Capital price (interest rate) elasticity of U.S. natural gas supply (E
r
1) is -0.1797 
(Table 13) in Model 1, but in Model 4 it (E
r
t) was positive until July 2005, and after that 
it turned negative (Figure 8). It was steadily decreasing until Sep. 1990, and it was 
stagnant (slightly increasing) around 0.08 to 0.12 in the 1990‟s. During the 2000‟s the 
elasticity decreased steadily. This pattern roughly corresponds to the yearly pattern of 
average product of capital index in petroleum and coal production industry
12
 (Table 14). 
The index was stagnant in the range of 92 to 94 during 1990-1997, it was decreasing in 
2000-2003, and it decreased rapidly after 2004. The positive elasticity in price of capital 
until July 2005 means that the changes were from E0 to E2 in Figure 6, and the negative 
elasticity means that the changes were from E0 to E1. 
 Output price elasticity of U.S. natural gas in Model 1 is -0.0012, but it is not 
significant (p-value is 0.872, Table 13). In Model 4, it was negative before Aug. 1981, 
but we cannot be sure it is significant because during that period natural gas price and 
production were highly regulated by the U.S. government. Also, after Aug. 1981, the 
                                                 
11
 Source: EIA (Energy Information Administration) data base. Available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/info_glance/natural_gas.html 
12
 Source: BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) data base. Available at 
http://www.bls.gov/mfp/ 
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U.S. natural gas supply is highly inelastic and near zero (E
p
t is between -0.0447 and 
0.0879, Figure 9). An inelastic price elasticity of U.S. natural gas supply can be 
explained by the characteristic of natural gas production. Natural gas production needs 
very expensive and huge amounts of infrastructure and facilities such as finding and 
drilling machinery, compression facilities, pipelines, and underground storage. Natural 
gas supply cannot exceed the infrastructure and facilities restriction regardless of natural 
gas prices. Idling the infrastructure and facilities is very costly even if the output price 
falls. So we can infer that natural gas supply is inelastic to output prices, and that supply 
is more dependent on the level of infrastructure and facilities.  
 Figure 10 shows the response of U.S. natural gas supply to the depletion of U.S. 
natural gas reserves. The percentage change of U.S. natural gas supply when there is a 
1% increase in depletion in Model 1 (E
d
1) is 0.1839 (Table 13). In Model 4, the depletion 
elasticity (E
d
t) is positive during May 1976-Apr. 2005, and after that it changed to 
negative (Figure 10). The positive elasticity means that the cost decreasing effect 
(finding and extracting natural gas from new wells was less costly with new technology) 
of technology development was greater than the cost increasing effect of depletion 
(finding and extracting natural gas from new wells was more costly with the same 
technology as depletion proceeds). This result agrees with the results by Cuddington and 
Moss (1996). They found technological change prevented the sharp rise of U.S. natural 
gas production costs due to depletion during 1967-1990. However, since May 2005 the 
results of Model 4 show that technology development did not cover all the cost increases 
by depletion because E
d
t has been negative.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
In summary, we conclude that technology change effects in U.S. natural gas 
supply are gradual, and also conclude that to capture the gradual effects in U.S. natural 
gas supply the STR model with time-varying coefficients is useful. Also we estimated 
the time-varying supply elasticities for U.S. natural gas.  
 The estimation results show that until May 2004 technology development did not 
cover all of the effects of labor cost increases, but after that technology development 
overwhelmed the effects of labor cost increases. Until July 2005 the technology 
development marginal product increasing effect exceeded the capital input cost increases, 
but after that the technology development effect did not cover all of the capital input cost 
increases. U.S. natural gas supply is concluded to be highly inelastic to output price 
because of the characteristic of natural gas industry as a heavy chemical industry 
requiring huge amounts of infrastructure and investment facilities. Until April 2005, 
technology development covered the entire depletion problem in U.S. natural gas 
production, but after that the cost increase due to depletion became greater than the cost 
decrease from technology development. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MODELING AND ANALYZING THE CHANGES OF BIDDING BEHAVIOR BY 
BID AFFILIATION IN REPEATED SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH 
POSTED PRICES 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
In many cases, the data from market observations are not enough to get 
meaningful information to test market mechanism or economic theory. To overcome this 
problem, an experimental method is often used. Experimental auctions have increasingly 
been used by market researchers to obtain market value of goods or consumers‟ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for goods. Usually, the repeated bidding by subjects is 
employed in experimental auctions because researchers can get many experimental 
observations with less cost (Alfnes and Rickertsen 2003; Buhr et al. 1993; Fox, Hayes 
and Shogren 2002; Lusk et al. 2004). In the repeated auction experiments, subjects bid 
repeatedly on the same goods in each round. After each round, the winning prices are 
posted for all subjects, and the winner of each round pays his or her bid for the good if 
the auction is a binding contract.  The reason for posting the winning bid is that much 
information can be sent through a posted price to bidders, and with the information 
bidders can understand the bidding mechanism better and learn more about the market. 
The posted price can help subjects to form their willingness to pay prices for the good, 
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and by posting the winning price the researchers can get a more exact market WTP for 
the good.  
However, the posted price may affect the subjects‟ next bids and bidders may 
change their bidding behaviours regardless of their true WTP which is called bid 
affiliation (Harrison et al, 2004, Corrigan and Rousu, 2006). If a bid affiliation in a 
repeated auction is serious, the actual bid prices may be biased. Harrison et al (2004) 
claimed three fundamental problems in eliciting exact bid values from repeated 
laboratory auctions. First, field-price censoring occurs since a rational subject will not 
bid more than the price of the outside market she recognizes regardless of her true 
willingness to pay (WTP). Second, beliefs about field prices are affiliated since a subject 
will adjust her belief about market prices after watching the posted prices when she does 
not know much about the auction goods. Third, beliefs about the quality of the auction 
goods are affiliated since her perception about the quality of the good will be revised 
according to the posted prices. Corrigan and Rousu (2006) indicated the six reasons to 
cause a bid affiliation. First, the subjects derive the value of the products from other 
participants‟ bids when they are unfamiliar with the auction items. Second, they may 
infer the market price from other‟s bids when they do not know the outside market price. 
Third, there may be a “top-dog effect” when bidders want to be a winner. Fourth, when 
they feel that there is no chance of winning the auction item, there is a tendency to 
submit significantly higher bids. Fifth, other participants‟ high bids increase the 
credibility of the auction market. And sixth, there is a behavioral “anchoring effect” so 
bidders may adjust their bids around the posted prices. 
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Many previous studies (List and Shogren, 1999, Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2003, 
Harrison et al, 2004, Corrigan and Rousu, 2006) focused on testing whether there are bid 
affiliation effects in repeated Vickrey auction with posted prices exist or not. In this 
study, the primary objective is to suggest a model which enables us to estimate true 
WTP by analyzing the changes of bidding behavior due to bid affiliation in repeated 
second-price auction (Vickrey auction) with posted prices. To do this, a bid price 
function will be estimated, the bid affiliation effects will be tested by using the proxy 
variables to capture the bid affiliation effects which causes bidders to change their 
bidding behaviors. Furthermore, the true WTP will be estimated out of the bid price 
function. 
 
Literature Review 
 
A number of studies have evaluated the issue of bid affiliation in repeated trial 
auctions.  List and Shogren (1999) showed that posted prices affect bidding behaviours 
especially for unfamiliar products.  Specifically, they found that posted prices influence 
the behaviours of the median naïve bidders but not the behaviours of the median 
experienced bidders or the bidders for familiar goods.  They modelled the bids in round t 
as a function of the posted price in the previous round and estimated the bid function 
with fixed/random effects models of panel data.  To reduce the bid affiliation bias, they 
provided bidders with non-price information about the product and to increase their 
familiarity with the product.  Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003), using experimental data of 
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European consumers‟ WTP for U.S. beef, estimated a model of individual i‟s bid at 
round t using the first difference model of panel data. To capture the bid affiliation 
effects they included the time variable t and the difference between the posted price and 
i‟s bid at round t-1 as the explanatory variable set.  They revealed that the coefficient of 
this variable is positive and concluded that the mean bids increase over rounds and that 
the bids are affiliated with the posted prices, similar to the finding of List and Shogren 
(1999).  
To prove the bid affiliation effects, Corrigan and Rousu (2006) compared the 
control group with the treatment group. Some confederate bidders were inserted into the 
treatment group and were instructed to bid within a certain narrow range. They were 
directed in advance to place high bids for the products. Corrigan and Rousu estimated a 
bid function using a random effect model of panel data with a time variable t as an 
explanatory variable, and found that the mean bids increase more after each round in the 
treatment group than in the control group, which signifies that high posted prices can 
lead to greater bid affiliation effects.  
 Harrison et al (2004) estimated a bid function using panel Tobit model. They 
found that bid affiliation was significant in their experiment, and concluded that a one-
shot Vickrey auction is better to use than a repeated trial Vickrey auction when eliciting 
WTP. They also compared one control group (no information about goods) with two 
treatment groups (giving information and demonstration), and showed that giving 
information to bidders made bid price increase.  
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Data 
 
The dataset comes from the study of Corrigan and Rousu (2006) (CR hereafter) 
that used 10 repeated rounds of a second price auction for a university logo mug and a 
candy bar to test a bid affiliation effect. In this study, the candy bar case will be analyzed. 
The participants were university students (Kenyon, OSU, and NC State). The experiment 
was done for seven groups, and CR used confederate bidders for two groups to test 
whether high posted prices would subsequently lead to higher bids (the confederate 
bidders were directed in advance to place high bids). Table 15 shows the characteristics 
of the seven groups. The group 1 and group 7 are treatment groups, and others are 
control groups with no treatment. For each group and the all pooled group, bid functions 
will be estimated, bid affiliation effects will be tested, and the true WTP will be 
estimated.  
 
Unobserved Effects Tobit Model of Bid Affiliation 
 
Define ,i tBD  as participant i‟s bid in the repeated auction round t. If we assume 
the participants have true WTPs for a candy bar and there are bid affiliation effects in the 
repeated auction, WTP  is different from ,i tBD  and is unobservable. We can only 
observe ,i tBD , and not WTP. If iWTP  is person i‟s true willingness to pay, we can set 
person i‟s bids as: 
  
52 
5
2
 
(32)   , , ,i t i i t i tBD WTP BA u    
where ,i tBA  is bid affiliation bias and ,i tu  is i.i.d. disturbance term with mean 0. Bid 
affiliation occurs when bidders incorporate feedback from the previous rounds into their 
current bid. So we can assume that bidders adjust their bids at round t based on their 
bidding error (winning bid minus their actual bid) of the previous round, and we can also 
assume that bidders come to know the auction mechanism and the market value of the 
good as rounds proceed as Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003) suggested. Then we can express 
the bid affiliation as: 
(33)   ......)()( 22121,1,21,1,1,   tbtbBDBDaBDBDaBA ti
w
titi
w
titi
  
where BD
w
 is the winning bid and t denotes round. The bid affiliation function (33) can 
have various functional forms such as 3
rd
 or higher order polynomial, logarithmic and so 
on. Many types of functional forms can be tested, but in this study first, second, and 
third order polynomial form will be tested and the best will be chosen based on BIC. The 
true willingness to pay, WTPi is assumed to be not time varying. This assumption makes 
sense because participants‟ WTP is more likely to be stable in 1 or 2 hour (it will take 1 
or 2 hour for 10 round bid). The bid function can be obtained by replacing ,i tBA  in 
equation (32) with equation (33). 
(34)   
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There are some problems in estimating equation (34). First, WTP is unobservable, so the 
OLS estimators without WTPi are not consistent (missing variable bias may exist). By 
first differencing equation (34), we can remove WTPi. However, the first differenced 
form of equation (34) still has an endogeneity problem. By first differencing, ∆BDit 
(=BDit - BDit-1) is included in the explanatory variable vector, and the error term changes 
to ∆uit (=uit - uit-1). Since BDit-1 and uit-1 are not independent of each other, an 
endogeneity problem may occur. We can avoid the endogeneity problem by using 
instrumental variables (IVs). A dynamic panel model suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) is an example of IV 
regression to avoid the endogeneity problem. However, a dynamic panel model still has 
a censoring problem. BDit is censored at zero because some participants‟ bids are zero. 
Table 16 shows the difference between average bids of the group including zero bids and 
excluding zero bids. From the difference in Table 16, we are certain that the zero bids 
can cause the estimation bias. To estimate this type of model, Wooldridge (2005) 
suggested the “unobserved effect Tobit model.” He verified MLE can guarantee 
consistent and efficient estimators with 3 assumptions as: 
 Assumption 1: The original model such as equation (34) is correctly defined. 
 Assumption 2: The unobserved effect such as WTPi can be correctly specified as 
                                    a functional form. 
 Assumption 3: The initial condition such as BDi1 should be included in the  
                                    functional form in the assumption 2. 
Assumption 1 and 2 are clear to understand. The assumption 3 in Wooldridge‟s model 
makes the difference from the Harrison et al (2004) model. Harrison et al also used a 
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panel Tobit model, and they concluded that one-shot Vickrey auction is better to elicit a 
true WTP because of bid affiliation effects. Their conclusion on one-shot Vickrey 
auction means that the first bid may contain some information about the true WTP, but 
they did not include the first bid in their model to analyze the repeated Vickrey auction 
experiment. 
 In this study, the Wooldridge‟s model (2005) is used to estimate equation (34). 
First, define WTPi as follows: 
(35)   iiiiii vGPAcmalecincomecBDccWTP  432110   
where incomei denotes person i‟s disposable income, malei is a gender dummy variable, 
and GPAi is person i‟s grade point average. Other variables are not included to estimate 
WTPi because only those three (disposable income, gender, GPA) were available in this 
experiment. By substituting (35) in (34), we can set a unobserved effect Tobit model 
(36)   
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where 
*
itBD  is a latent dependent variable (it can be negative) and gj are the dummy 
variables to specify the groups of each participant for the pooled model . Finally, I can 
obtain the likelihood function for MLE. 
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From MLE, we can get a consistent and efficient estimator of β, test the bid 
affiliation effect is significant, and calculate true willingness to pay. From the equations 
(36) and (37), the expected bid price ( )( itBDE

) and the expected bid affiliation terms 
( )( itBAE

) of each participant at round t are 
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Then the estimated true WTP of participant i at round t ( itWTP

), and the average WTP at 
round t ( tWTP ) are 
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Results and Discussion 
 
Table 17 contains the estimation results for each group. To compare each group, 
the third order form of the bid affiliation function is used. The results show that bid 
affiliation effects are significant for the treatment group (Group 1 and Group 7). The 
coefficients a1, a2 in Group 1 and a2, a3, b1, b2, b3 in Group 7 are significant at the 5% 
significance level. This result indicates that bidders in a repeated Vickrey auction are 
affected by the high posted price, and the bidders may increase their bids regardless of 
their true WTP when the winning bid of the previous round is high. On the contrary, the 
bid affiliation effects are not always significant for the control groups. For the Group 3 
and Group 6, all explanatory variables related to the bid affiliation effect (a and b) are 
not significant at the 5% significance level. The b1, b2, b3 for Group 2, b2, b3 for Group 4, 
and a1, a2, a3 for Group 5 are significant at the 5% significance level. Corrigan and 
Rousu (2006) also showed that bid affiliation effects are significant for the treatment 
group from their test results. They also concluded that the high posted prices in treatment 
groups induce bid affiliation and high bids in the next round.  
 To elicit the true WTP from a bid function, the best functional form of a bid 
function for each group and all pooled groups is chosen. The BICs of no bid affiliation 
form, and first-third order bid error (BD
w
t-1-BDit-1) and trend (t) forms are shown in 
Table 18. The functional form with the smallest BIC is chosen. For Group 1, the second 
order bid error form is chosen, and first order bid error and first order trend form is 
selected for Group 2. No bid affiliation form has the smallest BIC for Group 3, and first 
  
57 
5
7
 
order bid error form is the best for Group 4. For Group 5, third order bid error form is 
chosen, and for Group 6, the first order bid error form is selected. Third order bid error 
form is chosen for Group 7, and for the all pooled group, the third order bid error form is 
selected. 
 Table 19 contains the estimated coefficients of the selected form for each group 
and the all pooled group. From the results of the all pooled group model, we can confirm 
that each group differs from the others. The coefficients of group dummy variables (dj) 
are all significant at the 10% significance level. The base bid price (intercept c0 plus dj) 
for Group 7 is the largest among all groups, that for Group 1 is the second largest, and 
that for Group 2 is the smallest. For all cases, income is not significant for deciding bid 
price. We can infer the reason from the fact that the auction good, a candy bar, is a very 
common good, and it is a small percent of disposable income. Only for Group 1 and the 
all pooled group, male participants placed bids a little bit higher than female bidders. 
GPA is also not significant except for Group 4, Group 6, and the all pooled group. For 
the Group 2, Group 6, and the all pooled group, the initial bid is significant to decide the 
participants‟ bid price.  
 Figure 11 and Table 20 show the estimated average WTP of round t calculated 
with the estimated coefficients in Table 19 for each group and the all pooled group. For 
Group 1 which is a treatment group, the average actual bid shows an increasing pattern 
(Figure 11). The average actual bid was 0.28 in round 1 (Table 20), but it increased to 
0.73 in round 9. We can confirm that the increase of the actual bid was caused by bid 
affiliation effects from the fact that a1 and a2 are significant for Group 1 (Table 19). That 
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means the average actual bid is not the true willingness to pay. The estimated true WTP 
for Group 1 (WTP  for Group 1) is estimated as 0.68 (Table 20), and the estimated WTP 
at round t ( tWTP = itWTP

 ) shows a more stable pattern (no special pattern from 
round to round because the means of εit are zero) than the actual bid. tWTP  was the 
lowest (0.63) at round 3, and the highest (0.73) at round 8.  
 For group 2 which is a control group, the average actual bid changes over rounds 
(increased from 1 to 4 (0.34-0.42), then decreased), but the changes are less than Group 
1 (treatment of high winning bid). However, the bid affiliation effects are significant (b1 
is significant, Table 19). The true willingness to pay (WTP ) is estimated as 0.23, and 
tWTP  is stable (standard deviation is 0.009). 
 For group 3 (a control group), the average actual bid shows an increasing pattern 
(Figure 11) over the rounds (but not significant). It was 0.27 at round 1 and 0.42 (the 
highest) at round 7. tWTP  is very stable around 0.27 (standard deviation is 0.002), and 
the estimated true willingness to pay (WTP ) is 0.27. 
 The average actual bid and the winning bid for Group 4 (a control group) are the 
lowest among all groups. The bid affiliation effect is negative (a1 is estimated as -0.3724, 
Table 19), which means the true willingness to pay is higher than the actual bid, but 
bidders placed their bids lower than their WTP because the winning bid is low. The true 
willingness to pay (WTP ) excluding bid affiliation effects from the actual bid is 
estimated as 0.34 (Table 20).  
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 The pattern of average actual bids for Group 5 (a control group) does not show a 
specific form (Figure 11), but it is certain that bidders responded to the previous winning 
bid as a1, a2, a3 are significant (Table 19). The reason why the pattern is not a specific 
form can be inferred by the fact that the winning bid does not deviate much (standard 
deviation is 0.0275, the least among the control groups, Table 20). The true willingness 
to pay (WTP ) is estimated as 0.51, and tWTP  is also stable (standard deviation is 0.003, 
Table 20). 
 For Group 6 which is a control group, the pattern of the average actual bid is not 
clear, but the bid affiliation effect is significant and negatively related (a1 is significant 
and negative, Table 19). The unclear actual bid can be explained by the fluctuating 
winning bid. Because the winning bid fluctuates, the average actual bid moves the 
opposite way of the winning bid. The true willingness to pay (WTP ) excluding bid 
affiliation effects from the actual bid is estimated as 0.46 (Table 20), and tWTP  is stable 
(standard deviation is 0.003, Table 20). 
 Group 7 is a treatment group with intentional high bids. The average actual bid 
shows the increasing pattern except for round 7 and round 10 (Figure 11, Table 20). The 
bid affiliation effect is also significant (a1, a2, a3 are significant, Table 19). The winning 
bids were kept high (1.145 on average, Table 20), and the average actual bid was 0.27 at 
round 1, 0.60 at round 6 (the highest). The estimated true willingness to pay (WTP ) is 
estimated as1.22 (Table 20).  
 For the all pooled group, the winning bid was not much variant over rounds 
(mean is 1.145, standard deviation is 0.012, Table 20), but the bid affiliation effect is 
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significant (a2, a3 are significant, Table 19). The average actual bid was relatively stable 
(mean is 0.426, standard deviation is 0.04, Table 20) because the winning bid did not 
vary much. The true willingness to pay (WTP ) is estimated as 0.39 (Table 20), and 
tWTP  is stable (standard deviation is 0.01, Table 20). 
From the estimation results of Table 19, Table 20, and Figure 11, we can 
conclude that the pattern of the average actual bid is increasing when the winning bid is 
consistently high (Group 1 and Group 7). When the winning bid deviates up and down 
much, the average actual bid does not much deviate because the winning bid is not 
credible as an indicator of market value to bidders and bidders can‟t get much 
information from the posted prices (Group 2). The pattern is negatively related to the 
winning bid of the previous round, when the winning bid is not high but the bid tends to 
deviate up and down (Group 3, Group 4, and Group 6). The negative relationship 
between the winning bid and the average actual bid means bidders show a negative 
adjustment (one of bid affiliation effect). In other words, when the winning bid of the 
previous round increases, bidders are likely to decrease their bid, and when the winning 
bid of previous round decrease, bidders are likely to increase their bid. When the 
winning bid deviates not much, the average actual bid also deviates not much because 
the posted price is informative enough for bidders to decide their WTP (Group 5 and all 
pooled group). 
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Summary and Concluding Remark 
 
The repeated Vickrey auction method is now widely used to elicit consumer‟s 
WTP because researchers can get more information about WTP with less costs than a 
one-shot Vickrey auction. However, the bid affiliation effect is always a problem to 
elicit the true WTP, because the bid affiliation effects change participants‟ bidding 
behavior and make a significant difference between the actual bid and the true WTP 
especially when there are high winning bids.  
In this study, an empirical method to separate the bid affiliation effects from the 
actual bid to elicit true WTP was suggested. To capture the changes of bidding behavior 
caused by bid affiliation effects, proxy variables such as a function of bidding error 
(BD
w
t-1-BDit-1) and trend (t) are used and the unobserved effect Tobit model for panel 
data is employed. Analyzing the data from the experiment of Corrigan and Rousu‟s 
(2006), we concluded that the bid affiliation effect is significant especially when the 
high winning bid is posted, and the non time-varying, true WTP is estimated using the 
unobserved effect Tobit model.  
One more thing we should remember in using the unobserved effect Tobit model 
for a repeated Vickrey auction with posted prices is to use a well developed 
experimental design. A well developed experimental design guarantees to satisfy the 
three assumptions of the unobserved effect Tobit model. From the data of the well 
designed experiment, we can decrease the bid affiliation effects and can get a more 
accurate bid affiliation function (equation (33)) and bid function (equation (34)). Also, 
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when we design the experiment, we should consider in advance what information we 
need from the participants to estimate the true willingness to pay function (equation 
(35)). 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
 
The effects of an economic event can be evaluated by structural changes, and the 
structural changes can be estimated by economic parameter changes. Parameter changes 
over time can be estimated by three ways. First, if the changes are abrupt and 
instantaneous, dummy variable model can be applied. Second, if structural changes are 
gradual and smooth, a smooth transition regression model can be used. Third, if we 
know the proxy variable for the cause of structural changes, the proxy variable can be 
used to capture the effect of the structural changes. 
 In Chapter II, it was hypothesized and tested that the BSE outbreak in the U.S. in 
December 2003 and the subsequent embargo on beef imports by Korea abruptly changed 
the Korean meat demand structure. An LA/AIDS model with dummy variables was used 
in this chapter. From the results, it is concluded that the substitutable and complementary 
characteristics among Korean beef, pork, chicken, and the U.S. beef, and the 
responsiveness to income had changed because of the BSE 2003. It is inferred that food 
safety concerns made Korean beef consumption less elastic to budget, and pork and 
chicken more elastic to budget. Korean beef became less own price elastic, but pork and 
U.S. beef got more price elastic. 
 In Chapter III, smooth and gradual structural change was analyzed in regard to 
the effects of technology development on natural gas production in the United States. 
Time-varying parameters were estimated to capture the gradual effect of technology 
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change on natural gas supply. A smooth transition regression model with an assumed 
logistic coefficient function is applied. In addition, the changes in natural gas production 
caused by depleting reserves are measured by a proxy variable of past cumulative 
production. The estimation results show that technology development did not cover all 
of the effects of labor cost increases before 2004, but after that it surpassed the cost 
increasing effects of labor input. For the capital input, the productivity improvement 
effect of technology development covered all the cost increasing effects of capital input 
before 2005, but after that it overwhelmed the effects of capital input cost increase. The 
supply elasticity of U.S. natural gas for labor showed an increasing pattern from negative 
to positive, and that for capital showed a decreasing pattern from positive to negative. 
The supply responsiveness of the U.S. natural gas to the output price is concluded not to 
be significant and the responsiveness to depletion showed a decreasing pattern from 
positive to negative. 
 The effects of posting the winning bid in a repeated Vickrey auction on the 
bidding behavior were analyzed in Chapter IV. Bidding error (winning bid minus actual 
bid in the previous round) and trend were used as proxy variables to capture the effects 
of posting the winning bid. By estimating bid function using an unobserved effects Tobit 
model, it is concluded that bid affiliation effects are significant when the posted price is 
high. Also, true willingness to pay for a candy bar auction case done by Corrigan and 
Rousu was elicited from the estimated bid function by extracting bid affiliation effects.  
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APPENDIX A 
FIGURES 
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Figure 1. Consumption in Korean meat market 
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Figure 2. Market shares of Korean meat market 
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* 45° line means the distribution of error terms is perfect multivariate normal. 
 
Figure 3. Graphical test of multivariate normality 
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Figure 4. U.S. natural gas gross withdrawals 
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Figure 6. Technology change and input 
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Figure 8. Supply elasticities of U.S. natural gas for labor and capital cost 
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Figure 9. Output price elasticities of U.S. natural gas supply 
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Figure 10. Depletion elasticities of U.S. natural gas supply 
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Figure 11. Estimated true willingness to pay 
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Figure 11. Continued 
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Figure 11. Continued 
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Figure 11. Continued 
  
85 
8
5
 
APPENDIX B 
TABLES 
 
Table 1.  Test Results of Functional Form 
A. Equation by equation test (RESET test, H0: no omitted variable) 
Model A,  F (p-value) Model B,      F (p-value)
 
Korean beef 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Pork 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Chicken 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
U.S. beef 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
 
1.45 (0.2360) 
1.77 (0.1591) 
1.75 (0.1636) 
 
1.74 (0.1646) 
1.89 (0.1379) 
1.88 (0.1402) 
 
0.89 (0.4483) 
2.81 (0.0450)
 
2.75 (0.0485) 
 
1.01 (0.3919) 
1.82 (0.1508) 
2.02 (0.1181) 
Korean beef 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Pork 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Chicken 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
 
 
 
 
 
1.80 (0.1515) 
1.72 (0.1684) 
1.73 (0.1655) 
 
2.77 (0.0455) 
2.14 (0.0992) 
2.12 (0.1026) 
 
0.18 (0.9073) 
2.06 (0.1097) 
2.03 (0.1140) 
 
 
 
 
* Underline means omitted variable bias is suspected at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 1.  Continued 
B. Results of joint equation comparison among types  
Model A 
Type I Type II Type III 
w/ ρDS w/o ρDS w/ ρDS w/o ρDS w/ ρDS w/o ρDS 
Equa- 
tion 
(10) 
H0: ρ=0 
 
BIC 
χ2=43.04 
(0.1133) 
-1807.52 
- 
 
-1925.57 
χ2=44.86 
(0.0816) 
-1825.51 
- 
 
-1941.59 
χ2=47.35 
(0.0505) 
-1813.99 
- 
 
-1928.10 
Equa- 
tion 
(11) 
H0: ρ=0 
 
BIC 
χ2=18.63 
(0.0680) 
-1797.87 
- 
 
-1913.05 
χ2=18.57 
(0.0692) 
-1783.75 
- 
 
-1898.98 
χ2=18.06 
(0.0802) 
-1770.15 
- 
 
-1886.33 
 
Model B 
Type I Type II Type III 
w/ ρDS w/o ρDS w/ ρDS w/o ρDS w/ ρDS w/o ρDS 
Equa- 
tion 
(10) 
H0: ρ=0 
 
BIC 
χ2=14.22 
(0.8934) 
-1363.55 
- 
 
-1554.47 
χ2=18.67 
(0.6653) 
-1384.25 
- 
 
-1569.09 
χ2=18.48 
(0.6772) 
-1374.41 
- 
 
-1560.09 
Equa- 
tion 
(11) 
H0: ρ=0 
 
BIC 
χ2=18.73 
(0.6617) 
-1368.09 
- 
 
-1545.28 
χ2=18.17 
(0.6956) 
-1358.06 
- 
 
-1535.77 
χ2=17.97 
(0.7078) 
-1348.96 
- 
 
-1526.79 
* BIC = -2lnL + klnN (L: maximized log-likelihood, k: number of parameters estimated, 
N: sample size) 
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Table 2.  Test Results of Normality 
A. Equation by equation test (H0: The error term of each equation follows normal 
distribution) 
 
   Skew- 
 ness 
   Kurto- 
    sis 
D‟Agostino 
(χ2) 
Shapiro-
Wilk(Z) 
Shapiro-
Francia(Z) 
 
Model A 
     
Kor. beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
U.S. beef 
 
-0.5195 
 0.4267 
 -0.3781 
 0.6393 
 
3.7621 
3.7746 
3.6264 
5.3309 
 
 7.38 (0.0250) 
 6.19 (0.0453) 
2.27 (0.3219) 
14.64 (0.0007) 
 
1.116 (0.1323) 
0.928 (0.1768) 
-0.110 (0.5436) 
2.478 (0.0066) 
 
1.427 (0.0767) 
1.276 (0.1010) 
0.558 (0.2883) 
2.701 (0.0035) 
 
Model B      
Kor. beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
 
-0.3704 
0.3875 
-0.0492 
 
3.8041 
3.8597 
4.0731 
 
 6.80 (0.0335) 
  7.30 (0.0260) 
5.20 (0.0744) 
 
1.566 (0.0586) 
1.526 (0.0635) 
  2.494 (0.0063) 
 
1.706 (0.0440) 
1.699 (0.0447) 
 2.544 (0.0055) 
 
* The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. 
* Underline means the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
 
B. Joint equation test (H0: The mean/variance of Mahanalobis distance and 
calculated χ2 value are same) 
 Model A Model B 
Mean (t) -0.05 (0.957) -0.03 (0.973) 
Variance (F)  1.55 (0.009)  1.36 (0.029) 
* The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. 
* Underline means the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 3.  Test Results of Endogeneity 
A. Weak (under) identification test of instrumental variables 
Shea’s Partial R2 (from auxiliary regression of 
potential endogenous variables) 
Kleibergen-Paap LM  
(χ2) 
(H0: Under identified) 
Model A 
ln(PKorean beef) 
ln(Ppork) 
ln(Pchicken) 
ln(PUS beef) 
ln(X/P
*
) 
 
0.8697 
0.9143 
0.7353 
0.6989 
0.9017 
Model B 
ln(PKorean beef) 
ln(Ppork) 
ln(Pchicken) 
ln(X/P
*
) 
 
 
0.7950 
0.8732 
0.6242 
0.8808 
 
 
Model A (p-value) 
30.242 (0.0015) 
 
Model B (p-value) 
37.989 (0.0000) 
 
B. Hansen’s Over identification test of instrumental variables (H0: IVs are  
independent of error term) 
Model A Hansen’s J (p-value) Model B Hansen’s J (p-value) 
Korean beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
U.S. beef 
6.553 (0.7668) 
6.430 (0.7780) 
6.632 (0.7597) 
6.781 (0.7459) 
Korean beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
 
6.871 (0.6506) 
6.865 (0.6511) 
7.249 (0.6112) 
 
 
C. Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity (H0: IVs are exogenous) 
Model A χ
2
 (p-value) Model B χ
2
 (p-value) 
Korean beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
U.S. beef 
0.098 (0.9998) 
0.004 (1.0000) 
0.031 (1.0000) 
0.164 (0.9995) 
Korean beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
 
0.089 (0.9990) 
0.079 (0.9992) 
0.070 (0.9994) 
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Table 4. Test Results of Homoskedasticity and Independence 
A. Equation by Equation test 
 
Breuch-Pagan 
χ2 (p-value) 
(H0: constant 
variance) 
ARCH LM 
χ2 (p-value) 
(H0: no ARCH) 
Breusch-Godfrey 
χ2 (p-value) 
(H0: no 
autocorrelation) 
Ljung-Box Q 
χ2 (p-value) 
(H0: white noise) 
Model A 
Kor. beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
U.S. beef 
 
Model B 
Kor. beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
 
6.10 (0.0135) 
3.67 (0.0554) 
 7.93 (0.0049) 
  7.38 (0.0066) 
 
 
18.13 (0.0000) 
10.97 (0.0009) 
32.96 (0.0000) 
 
2.891 (0.0891) 
11.337 (0.0008) 
2.340 (0.1261) 
0.154 (0.6943) 
 
 
15.752 (0.0001) 
12.573 (0.0004) 
18.993 (0.0000) 
 
5.798 (0.0160) 
2.234 (0.1350) 
14.434 (0.0001) 
5.952 (0.0147) 
 
 
5.005 (0.0253) 
3.454 (0.0631) 
31.711 (0.0000) 
 
64.962 (0.0075) 
39.918 (0.4739) 
53.794 (0.0713) 
23.312 (0.9837) 
 
 
86.438 (0.0000) 
69.576 (0.0026) 
131.61 (0.0000) 
* Underline means the rejection of null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. 
B. Joint equation test (Multivariate Ljung-Box Q test, H0: white noise) 
Model A: χ2 (p-value) Model B: χ2 (p-value) 
516.1696 (0.9999) 326.3972 (0.8977) 
 
 
Table 5.  Wald Test Results of Homogeneity and Symmetry 
 H0: Homogeneity (χ
2
) H0: Symmetry (χ
2
) 
Model A 39.02 (0.0000) 109.61 (0.0000) 
Model B 39.72 (0.0000) 124.72 (0.0000) 
* The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. 
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Table 6.     Summary Statistics of Expenditure Share for Each Korean Meat 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Model A 
Korean beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
U.S. beef 
 
0.3281611 
0.5508403 
0.0893455 
0.0316532 
 
0.0784879 
0.0886962 
0.0228878 
0.0155512 
 
0.1681645 
0.3668760 
0.0471182 
0.0000022 
 
0.5067226 
0.7688179 
0.1576779 
0.0822078 
Sum 1    
Model B 
Korean beef 
Pork 
Chicken 
 
0.3238172 
0.5894983 
0.0866846 
 
0.0802179 
0.0867627 
0.0243384 
 
0.1681653 
0.3852371 
0.0393559 
 
0.5321102 
0.7698209 
0.1633450 
Sum 1    
 
 
Table 7.  Non-linear Wald Test Results of Separability for Korean Meat Demand 
H0 χ
2
 p-value 
Model A 
Korean beef can be aggregated with others 
Pork can be aggregated with others 
Chicken can be aggregated with others 
U.S. beef can be aggregated with others 
Meat group is separable 
 
21269.17 
71201.94 
72793.64 
8917.75 
62985.78 
 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Model B 
Korean beef can be aggregated with others 
Pork can be aggregated with others 
Chicken can be aggregated with others 
Meat group is separable 
 
6350.14 
3112.52 
6740.76 
9781.58 
 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table 8. Estimated Model Evaluation of Korean Meat Demand 
 # of obs RMSE R
2 χ2 (p-value) BIC 
Model A 
  Kor. beef 
  Pork 
  Chicken 
  U.S. beef  
 
116 
116 
116 
116 
 
0.0305379 
0.0285483 
0.0061336 
0.0057217 
 
0.8437 
0.8955 
0.9276 
0.8632 
 
  643.7 (0.0000) 
  994.4 (0.0000) 
1485.3 (0.0000) 
  731.9 (0.0000) 
-1941.593 
Model B 
  Kor. beef 
  Pork 
  Chicken 
 
156 
156 
156 
 
0.0328122 
0.0288459 
0.0065527 
 
0.8316 
0.8888 
0.9270 
 
  770.4 (0.0000) 
1246.3 (0.0000) 
1982.4 (0.0000) 
-1569.086 
* BIC = -2lnL + klnN (L: maximized log-likelihood, k: number of parameters estimated, 
N: sample size) 
 
 
  
92 
9
2
 
Table 9. Model Estimation Results for Korean Meat Demand 
A. Model A 
i Kor. beef Pork Chicken U.S. beef 
αi  1.0472490  0.3523931  0.4900749** -0.8897163*** 
δ2i -0.8465808  0.7887561 -0.4810409  0.5388663 
δ3i -0.0274064***  0.0139311*  0.0087498***  0.0047255*** 
γi,kor  0.0177420 -0.0563418***  0.0105842**  0.0280157*** 
γi,pork -0.2184505***  0.2681400*** -0.0360316*** -0.0136579** 
γi,chk -0.1044988**  0.0218927  0.0911540*** -0.0085480 
γi,usb  0.0561442*** -0.0544046*** -0.0199214***  0.0181818*** 
ø2i,kor  0.0883516 -0.0325575  0.0108232 -0.0666174* 
ø2i,pork  0.0675684 -0.0763873 -0.0324237  0.0412426* 
ø2i,chkk  0.1638852 -0.2088813* -0.0245436  0.0695397*** 
ø2i,usb -0.0646244*  0.0719658**  0.0151384** -0.0224798*** 
βi  0.0812664 -0.0774265 -0.0417998***  0.0379589*** 
η2i -0.0785835  0.0736939  0.0407024*** -0.0358127*** 
θi2 -0.0401499**  0.0437011*** -0.0000700 -0.0036211 
θi3 -0.0800347***  0.0830582***  0.0083785*** -0.0114020*** 
θi4 -0.0724747***  0.0699389***  0.0137181*** -0.0111823*** 
θi5 -0.0563995***  0.0370905***  0.0279005*** -0.0085915*** 
θi6 -0.0568842***  0.0224763  0.0413816*** -0.0069738** 
θi7 -0.0702580***  0.0202505  0.0606558*** -0.0106483*** 
θi8 -0.0450274***  0.0217531  0.0330829*** -0.0098086*** 
θi9  0.0134122 -0.0193608  0.0080313*** -0.0020827 
θi10 -0.0999039***  0.0987087***  0.0139306*** -0.0127354*** 
θi11 -0.0825826***  0.0858749***  0.0097282*** -0.0130206*** 
θi12 -0.0622835***  0.0623865***  0.0128424*** -0.0129455*** 
* Model A: See Equation (15) on page 14. D1t is zero for Model A. 
*, **, *** means the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
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Table 9. Continued 
B. Model B 
i Kor. beef Pork Chicken 
αi  1.6418980 -1.0402110  0.3983126* 
δ1i -4.5113260**  5.3912830*** -0.87995836** 
δ2i -1.2288080  1.4630500 -0.2342410 
δ3i -0.0232718**  0.0139190*  0.0093528*** 
γi,kor  0.0323894 -0.0405443*  0.0081549 
γi,pork -0.2070550***  0.2482374*** -0.0411824*** 
γi,chk -0.0649958 -0.0162156  0.0812114*** 
ø1i,kor  0.1965634* -0.1758636* -0.0206998 
ø1i,pork -0.0734495  0.0095764  0.0638730*** 
ø1i,chkk  0.2021180*** -0.1337605* -0.0683575*** 
ø2i,kor  0.0388415 -0.0303126 -0.0085291 
ø2i,pork  0.0154812  0.0200907 -0.0355719* 
ø2i,chkk  0.1803556 -0.1780101* -0.0023455 
βi  0.0450606 -0.0073771 -0.0376835*** 
η1i  0.0845448 -0.1408896  0.0563449*** 
η2i -0.0416242  0.0047195  0.0369047*** 
θi2 -0.0589710***  0.0550871***  0.0038839 
θi3 -0.1034252***  0.0931296***  0.0102956*** 
θi4 -0.0861582***  0.0711678***  0.0149904*** 
θi5 -0.0703978***  0.0407963***  0.0296015*** 
θi6 -0.0659184***  0.0242767*  0.0416418*** 
θi7 -0.0806626***  0.0181767  0.0624858*** 
θi8 -0.0595505***  0.0255376**  0.0340129*** 
θi9  0.0132430 -0.0218182*  0.0085752*** 
θi10 -0.1097711***  0.0952493***  0.0145218*** 
θi11 -0.0933860***  0.0833277***  0.0100583*** 
θi12 -0.0649988***  0.0532024***  0.0117964*** 
* Model: See Equation (15) on page 14. 
*, **, *** means the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
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Table 10. Test Results of BSE Effects on the Korean Meat Market 
Null hypothesis  
(for all i, j) 
                 χ2 (p-value) Result (5% significance level) 
Model A  
H0: δ2i= 0  
H0: ø2ij = 0  
H0: η2i= 0  
H0: All of the above 
 
4.30 (0.2306) 
63.78 (0.0000) 
24.47 (0.0000) 
338.29 (0.0000) 
 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Model B 
H0: δ1i = 0  
H0: δ2i = 0  
H0: ø1ij = 0  
H0: ø2ij = 0  
H0: η1i = 0  
H0: η2i = 0  
H0: δ1i = ø1ij = η1i =0  
H0: δ2i = ø2ij = η2i =0 
H0: All of the above 
 
26.49 (0.0000) 
1.23 (0.5399) 
48.41 (0.0000) 
11.25 (0.0809) 
19.04 (0.0001) 
12.06 (0.0024) 
119.73 (0.0000) 
20.64 (0.0238) 
138.18 (0.0000) 
 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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Table 11. Estimated Korean Meat Demand Elasticities 
i Marshallian Price Elasticities of Demand(εij) 
Expenditure 
Elasticity(ηi) 
Model A 
D1=D2=0 (-2003.12) 
Kor. beef 
 
j:     Kor. beef 
 
-1.02720160 
(0.0000) 
Pork 
 
-0.80209195 
(0.0000) 
Chicken 
 
-0.34056304 
(0.0075) 
U.S. beef 
 
0.16324859 
(0.0041) 
1.24764190 
(0.0000) 
Pork 
 
-0.05615737 
(0.1216) 
-0.43579087 
(0.0000) 
0.05230254 
(0.4612) 
-0.09431734 
(0.0029) 
0.85944094 
(0.0000) 
Chicken 
 
0.27199182 
(0.0000) 
-0.14557591 
(0.2667) 
0.06204153 
(0.5094) 
-0.20816137 
(0.0000) 
0.53215561 
(0.0001) 
U.S. beef 
 
0.49154647 
(0.0001) 
-1.09205880 
(0.0016) 
-0.37719464 
(0.1280) 
-0.46355386 
(0.0000) 
2.19921260 
(0.0000) 
D1=0,D2=1(2007.4-) 
Kor. beef 
 
-0.67938555 
(0.2761) 
-0.46428415 
(0.2201) 
0.18023677 
(0.6497) 
-0.02610037 
(0.8007) 
1.00817550 
(0.0000) 
Pork 
 
-0.15916540 
(0.6468) 
-0.64815896 
(0.0021) 
-0.33885525 
(0.1252) 
0.03209531 
(0.5772) 
0.99322552 
(0.0000) 
chicken 
 
0.24363271 
(0.5965) 
-0.75942037 
(0.0065) 
-0.25336563 
(0.3868) 
-0.05314479 
(0.4860) 
0.87717092 
(0.0000) 
U.S. beef 
 
-1.24177160 
(0.3059) 
0.83411985 
(0.2571) 
1.92081700 
(0.0128) 
-1.13793310 
(0.0000) 
1.06780300 
(0.0000) 
Model B 
D1=D2=0 (-2003.12) 
Kor. beef 
 
j:     Kor. beef 
 
-0.94503692 
(0.0000) 
Pork 
 
-0.72145064 
(0.0002) 
Chicken 
 
-0.21278008 
(0.1089)  
1.13915450 
(0.0000) 
Pork 
 
-0.06472541 
(0.0412) 
-0.57152355 
(0.0000) 
-0.02642272 
(0.6802)  
0.98748589 
(0.0000) 
Chicken 
 
0.23484581 
(0.0000) 
-0.21881633 
(0.1270) 
-0.02545559 
(0.7971)  
0.56527992 
(0.0001) 
D1=1,D2=0(-2007.3) 
Kor. beef 
 
-0.42256202 
(0.1387) 
-1.10218560 
(0.0064) 
0.38876088 
(0.0686)  
1.40024240 
(0.0000) 
Pork 
 
-0.28566091 
(0.0382) 
-0.41438902 
(0.0337) 
-0.23261086 
(0.0240)  
0.74848667 
(0.0000) 
Chicken 
 
-0.214429354 
(0.3138) 
0.13485407 
(0.6547) 
-0.87037727 
(0.0000)  
1.21527940 
(0.0000) 
D1=0,D2=1(2007.4-) 
Kor. beef 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.78346371 
(0.1752) 
-0.59786678 
(0.0322) 
0.35533003 
(0.2630)  
1.01061210 
(0.0000) 
Pork 
 
-0.11873886 
(0.6705) 
-0.54216211 
(0.0001) 
-0.32908554 
(0.0318)  
0.99549189 
(0.0000) 
Chicken 
 
-0.00140638 
(0.9974) 
-0.88014623 
(0.0000) 
-0.08941862 
(0.7057)  
0.99101502 
(0.0000) 
* The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. 
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Table 12. Estimated Model evaluation 
 R
2 
RMSE BIC  
 
Model 1 
 
0.4217 
 
0.0567800 
 
-1095.166 
 
* Non time-varying 
* OLS 
Model 2 0.6509 0.0450476 -1277.018 * Linearly time-varying 
* NLS 
Model 3 0.7893 0.0351298 -1459.046 * 2
nd
 order time-varying 
* NLS 
Model 4 0.8342 0.0312004 -1544.876 * 3
rd
 order time-varying 
* NLS 
* BIC = -2lnL + klnN (L: maximized log-likelihood, k: number of parameters estimated, 
N: sample size) 
  
97 
9
7
 
Table 13. Estimation Results of Model 1 and Model 4 
 
                  Model 1                  Model 4 
 
a 
 
16.5962 (0.000) 
 
a0 
a1 
a2 
a3 
 
17.414330000 (0.144) 
0.700864000 (0.000) 
-0.000021500 (0.972) 
-0.000005600 (0.001) 
 
 
b 
 
0.1809 (0.000) 
 
b0 
b1 
b2 
b3 
 
-0.594947900 (0.000) 
0.005711800 (0.032) 
-0.000026300 (0.054) 
0.000000043 (0.039) 
 
c -0.1797 (0.000) c0 
c1 
c2 
c3 
0.850802100 (0.000) 
-0.011020800 (0.000) 
0.000051400 (0.000) 
-0.000000076 (0.000) 
 
d=-b-c 
 
-0.0012 (0.872) 
 
 
 
 
 
e 
 
0.1839 (0.000) 
 
e0 
e1 
e2 
e3 
 
-0.193611500 (0.769) 
0.043158400 (0.000) 
-0.000045400 (0.200) 
-0.000000214 (0.008) 
 
 
m2 
m3 
m4 
m5 
m6 
m7 
m8 
m9 
m10 
m11 
m12 
 
-0.0948 (0.000) 
-0.0151 (0.210) 
-0.0623 (0.000) 
-0.0404 (0.002) 
-0.0760 (0.000) 
-0.0583 (0.000) 
-0.0515 (0.000) 
-0.1006 (0.000) 
-0.0499 (0.000) 
-0.0554 (0.000) 
-0.0091 (0.420) 
 
m2 
m3 
m4 
m5 
m6 
m7 
m8 
m9 
m10 
m11 
m12 
 
-0.0930 (0.000) 
-0.0180 (0.034) 
-0.0643 (0.000) 
-0.0471 (0.000) 
-0.0807 (0.000) 
-0.0574 (0.000) 
-0.0642 (0.000) 
-0.1084 (0.000) 
-0.0644 (0.000) 
-0.0698 (0.000) 
-0.0195 (0.038) 
* Model 1, Model 4: See Equation (31) on page 42. 
* The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. 
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Table 14. Various Changes in Inputs of U.S. Natural Gas Production (1987-2009) 
Year Average 
Product of 
Labor Index 
in Oil and Gas 
Extraction 
Industry 
(2000=100) 
Average 
Product of 
Capital Index 
in Petroleum 
and Coal  
Production 
Industry 
(2000=100) 
Number of 
Employees 
in Oil and 
Gas 
Extraction 
Industry 
(Thousand) 
Number 
of Gas and 
Gas 
Condensate 
Wells 
Number of 
Crude Oil 
and Natural 
Gas Rotary 
Rigs 
 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67.071 
67.664 
63.743 
63.380 
65.374 
68.278 
70.953 
73.267 
79.764 
82.101 
83.761 
84.744 
90.366 
100.000 
101.830 
103.671 
108.944 
93.520 
90.268 
84.023 
81.212 
   - 
   - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89.325 
91.738 
92.583 
93.288 
92.110 
92.811 
94.397 
93.321 
92.437 
92.010 
94.460 
97.168 
97.089 
100.000 
98.295 
97.642 
98.443 
101.674 
99.753 
96.884 
94.818 
   - 
   - 
 
156.5 
165.0 
177.0 
192.0 
218.6 
253.1 
264.5 
255.6 
251.9 
244.7 
216.6 
198.0 
194.5 
191.0 
190.2 
191.0 
182.2 
170.9 
162.4 
151.7 
146.9 
144.1 
140.8 
131.2 
124.9 
123.7 
121.9 
120.2 
123.4 
125.7 
134.5 
146.2 
160.5 
161.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
262,483 
269,790 
276,987 
267,014 
282,152 
291,773 
298,541 
301,811 
310,971 
316,929 
302,421 
341,678 
373,304 
387,772 
393,327 
406,147 
425,887 
440,516 
452,945 
478,562 
- 
 
1,658 
2,001 
2,259 
2,177 
2,909 
3,970 
3,105 
2,232 
2,428 
1,980 
964 
936 
936 
869 
1,010 
860 
721 
754 
775 
723 
779 
943 
827 
625 
918 
1,156 
830 
1,032 
1,192 
1,381 
1,649 
1,768 
1,879 
1,089 
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Table 15. Characteristics of the Seven Groups 
 Participants Number of Participants Treatment 
Group 1 Kenyon Univ. 
Students 
16 Confederate 
Bidders 
Group 2 Kenyon Univ. 
Students 
10 No treatment 
Group 3 Kenyon Univ. 
Students 
19 No treatment 
Group 4 OSU 
Students 
9 No treatment 
Group 5 OSU 
Students 
15 No treatment 
Group 6 NC State Univ. 
Students 
11 No treatment 
Group 7 NC State Univ. 
Students 
21 Confederate 
Bidders 
 
  
100 
1
0
0
 
Table 16. Average Bid Including Zero Bid and Excluding Zero Bid 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Group 1 
Ave. bid 
zero bid (%) 
Ave.non-zero 
 
0.281 
25% 
0.375 
 
0.314 
19% 
0.387 
 
0.453 
13% 
0.517 
 
0.425 
13% 
0.486 
 
0.508 
19% 
0.625 
 
0.420 
19% 
0.517 
 
0.605 
13% 
0.691 
 
0.578 
13% 
0.661 
 
0.726 
19% 
0.894 
 
0.602 
25% 
0.802 
Group 2 
Ave. bid 
zero bid (%) 
Ave. non-zero 
 
0.345 
50% 
0.690 
 
0.361 
50% 
0.722 
 
0.385 
50% 
0.770 
 
0.420 
40% 
0.700 
 
0.381 
40% 
0.635 
 
0.310 
50% 
0.620 
 
0.295 
50% 
0.590 
 
0.276 
50% 
0.552 
 
0.271 
40% 
0.452 
 
0.291 
50% 
0.582 
Group 3 
Ave. bid 
zero bid (%) 
Ave. non-zero 
 
0.267 
21% 
0.338 
 
0.268 
21% 
0.340 
 
0.333 
11% 
0.372 
 
0.339 
11% 
0.379 
 
0.320 
16% 
0.379 
 
0.374 
16% 
0.444 
 
0.419 
11% 
0.468 
 
0.327 
21% 
0.415 
 
0.344 
21% 
0.436 
 
0.399 
21% 
0.505 
Group 4 
Ave. bid 
zero bid (%) 
Ave. non-zero 
 
0.312 
22% 
0.401 
 
0.296 
0% 
0.296 
 
0.216 
11% 
0.243 
 
0.282 
0% 
0.282 
 
0.306 
0% 
0.306 
 
0.301 
0% 
0.301 
 
0.320 
0% 
0.320 
 
0.321 
0% 
0.321 
 
0.312 
0% 
0.312 
 
0.311 
0% 
0.311 
Group 5 
Ave. bid 
zero bid (%) 
Ave. non-zero 
 
0.657 
7% 
0.704 
 
0.619 
7% 
0.663 
 
0.590 
7% 
0.632 
 
0.487 
20% 
0.608 
 
0.611 
13% 
0.706 
 
0.586 
13% 
0.676 
 
0.576 
7% 
0.617 
 
0.609 
7% 
0.653 
 
0.522 
13% 
0.602 
 
0.486 
20% 
0.608 
Group 6 
Ave. bid 
zero bid (%) 
Ave. non-zero 
 
0.356 
18% 
0.436 
 
0.369 
18% 
0.451 
 
0.389 
18% 
0.476 
 
0.517 
18% 
0.632 
 
0.410 
18% 
0.501 
 
0.381 
18% 
0.466 
 
0.529 
18% 
0.647 
 
0.415 
18% 
0.507 
 
0.484 
18% 
0.507 
 
0.450 
18% 
0.550 
Group 7 
Ave. bid 
zero bid (%) 
Ave. non-zero 
 
0.271 
24% 
0.356 
 
0.452 
24% 
0.594 
 
0.483 
19% 
0.597 
 
0.518 
19% 
0.639 
 
0.542 
19% 
0.670 
 
0.598 
19% 
0.738 
 
0.483 
24% 
0.634 
 
0.533 
24% 
0.700 
 
0.533 
24% 
0.700 
 
0.510 
24% 
0.669 
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Table 17. Estimation Results of the Third Order Functional Form for Each Group 
 Group 1 Group2 Group3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 
 
a1 
 
1.4584 
(0.003) 
 
-0.0887 
(0.651) 
 
0.0614 
(0.825) 
 
-0.1960 
(0.207) 
 
0.3602 
(0.008) 
 
-0.1942 
(0.319) 
 
-0.1815 
(0.093) 
a2 -2.1333 
(0.008) 
-0.0710 
(0.370) 
-0.5857 
(0.219) 
-0.2177 
(0.276) 
-0.4042 
(0.000) 
0.0233 
(0.926) 
-0.7004 
(0.000) 
a3 0.5439 
(0.086) 
-0.0167 
(0.865) 
-0.0119 
(0.982) 
-0.6143 
(0.382) 
-0.2948 
(0.000) 
-0.4274 
(0.384) 
0.1202 
(0.035) 
b1 -1.1082 
(0.599) 
0.5026 
(0.046) 
0.1985 
(0.171) 
-0.1202 
(0.056) 
0.0915 
(0.561) 
-0.0276 
(0.846) 
0.5057 
(0.015) 
b2 0.0203 
(0.587) 
-0.0949 
(0.033) 
-0.0302 
(0.251) 
0.0222 
(0.047) 
-0.0033 
(0.907) 
0.0103 
(0.691) 
-0.0882 
(0.019) 
b3 -0.0010 
(0.616) 
0.0051 
(0.033) 
0.0015 
(0.314) 
-0.0012 
(0.047) 
-0.0004 
(0.810) 
-0.0007 
(0.606) 
0.0047 
(0.024) 
c0 0.6409 
(0.375) 
-0.4055 
(0.709) 
-0.3652 
(0.380) 
-0.3233 
(0.464) 
0.4725 
(0.529) 
1.7761 
(0.015) 
1.1784 
(0.010) 
c1 0.3480 
(0.262) 
0.5585 
(0.025) 
0.5865 
(0.002) 
0.0268 
(0.689) 
0.0162 
(0.898) 
0.9120 
(0.002) 
-0.1169 
(0.417) 
c2 -0.0010 
(0.019) 
0.0008 
(0.474) 
-0.0004 
(0.366) 
0.0001 
(0.183) 
-0.0005 
(0.538) 
0.0003 
(0.243) 
0.0001 
(0.606) 
c3 0.3214 
(0.010) 
0.2526 
(0.427) 
0.0976 
(0.173) 
-0.1166 
(0.105) 
0.0083 
(0.965) 
0.0549 
(0.555) 
0.0318 
(0.598) 
c4 0.0837 
(0.629) 
-0.1592 
(0.576) 
0.0614 
(0.525) 
0.2695 
(0.050) 
-0.0330 
(0.868) 
-0.6065 
(0.023) 
-0.0601 
(0.402) 
* The numbers in parenthesis are p-values 
* Model: See Equation (36) (d=0) on page 54.  
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Table 18. Comparison of BIC for Each Functional Form 
* Group 1 * Group 2 
A
* 
B
* 0 1 2 3 
A 
B 
0 1 2 3 
0 181.32 154.90 134.07 136.17 0 77.737 59.685 63.721 67.980 
1 169.90 155.61 137.94 140.11 1 79.339 57.306 61.769 66.223 
2 174.36 160.27 142.86 144.94 2 83.167 61.785 66.235 70.693 
3 179.43 164.88 147.60 149.66 3 85.714 62.599 66.312 70.784 
 
* Group 3 * Group 4 
A 
B 
0 1 2 3 
A 
B 
0 1 2 3 
0 80.172 87.407 86.329 94.198 0 -70.25 -147.6 -144.3 -140.2 
1 81.113 90.732 89.120 94.236 1 -67.10 -144.3 -140.3 -136.3 
2 84.807 94.864 92.655 97.797 2 -62.68 -139.9 -135.9 -131.9 
3 89.784 99.231 96.780 101.92 3 -59.91 -138.1 -135.0 -131.3 
 
* Group 5 * Group 6 
A 
B 
0 1 2 3 
A 
B 
0 1 2 3 
0 265.39 117.87 116.23 91.709 0 -9.446 -11.81 -7.351 -3.979 
1 269.41 122.70 120.72 96.286 1 -9.536 -8.889 -4.497 -0.708 
2 274.42 126.56 122.15 93.076 2 -6.096 -5.370 -1.013 2.775 
3 278.47 130.57 126.47 97.923 3 -1.524 -1.014 3.311 7.102 
 
* Group 7 * All pooled group 
A 
B 
0 1 2 3 
A 
B 
0 1 2 3 
0 280.17 211.85 184.93 180.81 0 985.08 616.24 620.48 522.15 
1 281.63 216.72 188.33 190.54 1 981.22 621.81 626.57 523.36 
2 282.23 221.50 192.52 195.49 2 982.85 623.72 628.79 523.68 
3 286.51 226.02 192.00 195.46 3 989.62 630.04 672.67 527.25 
* BIC = -2lnL + klnN (L: maximized log-likelihood, k: number of parameters estimated, 
N: sample size) 
* „A‟ means the order of bidding error and „B‟ means the order of trend. 
* The numbers in bold mean the lowest BIC.  
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Table 19. Estimated Coefficients of Selected Functional Form 
 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group 
3 
Group 
4 
Group 
5 
Group 
6 
Group 
7 
All  
Group 
 
a1 
 
0.7130 
(0.002) 
 
0.0398 
(0.671) 
 
- 
 
-0.3724 
(0.000) 
 
0.2816 
(0.044) 
 
-0.3268 
(0.007) 
 
-0.2311 
(0.032) 
 
0.0423 
(0.457) 
a2 -0.8162 
(0.000) 
- - - -0.4246 
(0.000) 
- -0.7218 
(0.000) 
-0.1202 
(0.000) 
a3 - - - - -0.2846 
(0.000) 
- 0.1473 
(0.008) 
-0.1430 
(0.000) 
b1 - -0.0268 
(0.006) 
- - - - - - 
c0 0.7101 
(0.235) 
0.2798 
(0.818) 
0.8898 
(0.000) 
-0.5270 
(0.159) 
0.7324 
(0.248) 
1.9606 
(0.007) 
2.0856 
(0.000) 
0.9526 
(0.003) 
c1 0.1923 
(0.498) 
0.6759 
(0.016) 
-0.0002 
(0.689) 
0.0289 
(0.635) 
0.0065 
(0.955) 
0.9759 
(0.001) 
-0.0843 
(0.561) 
0.2105 
(0.003) 
c2 -0.0008 
(0.056) 
0.0010 
(0.474) 
0.1031 
(0.244) 
0.0002 
(0.101) 
-0.0004 
(0.597) 
0.0003 
(0.279) 
0.0001 
(0.786) 
0.0000 
(0.985) 
c3 0.2755 
(0.019) 
0.3076 
(0.392) 
0.1055 
(0.373) 
-0.1062 
(0.099) 
0.0107 
(0.937) 
0.0392 
(0.686) 
0.0308 
(0.613) 
0.1369 
(0.039) 
c4 0.0372 
(0.822) 
-0.1882 
(0.571) 
-0.3258 
(0.416) 
0.2767 
(0.025) 
-0.0171 
(0.924) 
-0.6643 
(0.016) 
-0.0734 
(0.310) 
-0.0485 
(0.578) 
d2 - - - - - - - -0.7303 
(0.000) 
d3 - - - - - - - -0.6248 
(0.000) 
d4 - - - - - - - -0.6176 
(0.000) 
d5 - - - - - - - -0.4425 
(0.000) 
d6 - - - - - - - -0.5682 
(0.000) 
d7 - - - - - - - 0.1945 
(0.078) 
* The numbers in parenthesis are p-values 
* Model : See Equation (36) on page 54. 
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Table 20. Estimated Willingness to Pay (WTP) and Average Actual Bid 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. 
Group 
1 
tBD  0.281 0.314 0.453 0.425 0.508 0.420 0.65 0.578 0.726 0.602 0.491 0.139 
tBW  1.650 0.700 1.700 1.650 1.660 1.660 1.650 1.650 1.650 1.650 1.662 0.002 
tWTP

 - 0.633 0.631 0.680 0.699 0.700 0.707 0.731 0.701 0.644 0.680 0.036 
Group 
2 
tBD  0.345 0.361 0.385 0.420 0.381 0.310 0.295 0.276 0.271 0.291 0.334 0.052 
tBW  0.500 1.000 1.250 1.150 1.050 0.750 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.760 0.876 0.230 
tWTP

 - 0.232 0.230 0.232 0.229 0.225 0.222 0.220 0.247 0.215 0.228 0.009 
Group 
3 
tBD  0.267 0.268 0.333 0.339 0.319 0.374 0.419 0.327 0.344 0.399 0.339 0.050 
tBW  0.600 0.600 0.750 0.750 0.650 0.690 0.710 0.670 0.690 0.700 0.681 0.053 
tWTP

 - 0.270 0.274 0.274 0.272 0.272 0.276 0.270 0.270 0.270 0.272 0.002 
Group 
4 
tBD  0.312 0.296 0.216 0.282 0.306 0.301 0.320 0.321 0.321 0.311 0.298 0.031 
tBW  0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.410 0.410 0.450 0.450 0.400 0.400 0.432 0.041 
tWTP

 - 0.341 0.307 0.345 0.346 0.346 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.346 0.341 0.013 
Group 
5 
tBD  0.657 0.619 0.590 0.487 0.611 0.586 0.576 0.609 0.522 0.486 0.574 0.058 
tBW  1.000 1.050 1.000 1.020 1.050 1.050 1.030 1.080 1.000 0.050 1.033 0.028 
tWTP

 - 0.540 0.527 0.480 0.505 0.523 0.531 0.540 0.500 0.470 0.513 0.026 
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Table 20. Continued 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. 
Group 
6 
tBD  0.356 0.369 0.389 0.517 0.410 0.381 0.529 0.415 0.484 0.450 0.430 0.062 
tBW  0.750 0.650 0.610 0.900 0.700 0.700 0.950 0.750 0.700 0.750 0.746 0.105 
tWTP

 - 0.455 0.461 0.462 0.459 0.465 0.461 0.457 0.460 0.456 0.460 0.003 
Group 
7 
tBD  0.271 0.452 0.483 0.518 0.542 0.598 0.483 0.533 0.533 0.510 0.492 0.087 
tBW  1.650 1.850 2.000 1.900 1.890 2.000 1.850 2.000 2.000 1.800 1.894 0.114 
tWTP

 - 1.336 1.251 1.129 1.292 1.344 1.129 1.267 1.142 1.137 1.225 0.091 
All  
Pooled 
Group 
tBD  0.350 0.389 0.422 0.434 0.434 0.447 0.476 0.456 0.476 0.454 0.436 0.040 
tBW  1.042 0.137 1.201 1.200 1.151 1.152 1.155 1.165 1.137 1.116 1.145 0.012 
tWTP

 - 0.408 0.399 0.377 0.400 0.413 0.400 0.416 0.395 0.386 0.399 0.012 
* tBD : average actual bid, tBW : winning bid, tWTP

: estimated true willingness to pay 
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